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Accidents at sea are prone to attract public attent­
ion. Those particularly involving loss of human lives are 
always of concern in public policy and no society (includ­
ing that of the Philippines) is likely to view this con­
cern as misplaced.
Approximately 1,400 lives are thought to have been 
lost in major Philippine shipping accidents from 1988 to 
1989, not to mention the earlier sensational MV "Dona 
Paz", MV "Marilyn" and MV "Don Juan" incidents which 
claimed no less than a thousand lives in each case. But, 
the Philippine Government is hampered in its attempt to 
maximize the use of public resources for transport safety 
due to lack of information. It is not known, for example, 
how many lives could be saved per unit of expenditure on 
safety interventions.
The event that unfolded on the evening of 20 December 
1987, while the passenger-vessel MV "Dona Paz" was under­
way, within the Philippines from Tacloban City to Manila 
took to task the entire system of the country as regards 
transport safety, administrative capability and criminal 
culpabi1ity.
Faced with a casualty list from a minimum of 1,850 to 
a maximum of 4,000 drowned passengers (the former number
from the shipping company, the Sulpicio Lines, and the 
latter from the claimants/relatives of the passengers), 
recriminations were levelled at various offices - the 
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), the Philippine Coast 
Guard (PCG), the Department of Transportation and Communi­
cations (DOTC), and the shipping company/owner of MV "Dona 
Paz". Inquiry Committees were formed by the MARINA, PCG, 
the Presidential Office, the Senate and House of Represen­
tatives .
Amidst all the atmosphere of charges and counterchar­
ges, there is the distinct observation that these commit­
tees had interests to protect and reputation to build 
on. The PCG issued clearance for the vessel to sail, 
MARINA had awarded the franchise to the company to operate 
the vessel on the route, and the Executive and Legislative 
Offices had constituents to appease.
A positive ques^-ion is, therefore, posed as to 
v/hether there is an independent agency to adjudge and 
prescribe safety standards on sea transport and, in 
incidents of lost lives and property, to investigate the 
causes of such occurrences.
Hence, there is really an imperative need for a study 
on marine casualty investigations in order to be,able to 
v/isely elect which system shall be deemed ^oper and 
appropriate for the Philippines. A structure which shall 
serve as the forum for the evolution of rules, regula­
tions, and recommendations for the advancement of trans­
sport safety has to be proposed. Likewise, innovative
methods and techniques in the investigation process should 
be introduced, aimed at effectively determining the magni­
tude, causes, and possible remedies for marine accidents/ 
incident s.
2. Problsin Areas
This Study sees the following problem areas, to wit:
2.1 Apparent overlapping of functions between the 
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) and the 
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), otherwise known as 
the Maritime Administration and the Maritime 
Safety Administration, respectively, in matters 
of safety regulations e.g. the registration and 
inspection of ships, as v;ell as, of casualty in­
vestigations .
2.2 Possibilities of conflict of interest in the 
exercise of the investigative powers by MARINA 
and PCG, both being regulatory bodies.
2.3 The need for advanced and continuing education/ 
training programs for investigation officers.
2.4 The need for new methods and techniques by which 
the investigation process in the Philippines 




seeks to achieve the 
Philippine perspective:
the problem areas. This study 
following objectives within the
3.1 To introduce a more appropriate and adequate 
marine casualty investigation system in the 
Phi 1ippines.
3.2 To identify the legislative and administrative 
needs in the furtherance of the system.
3.3 To improve the investigative processes/proce­
dures .
4. Methodology
This study shall be based on:
4.1 Studies on the profile of other countries' mari­
time casualty investigation systems undertaken 
by certain resource persons.
4.2 Reference materials available at the World Mari­
time University library.
The personal knowledge of the author as an ex­
perienced legal officer of MARINA and supported 
by documents/papers made available to her by 
said office.
4.3
4.4 Field studies conducted with the various ports 
and shipping administrations of other countries.
4.5 Extended field-study programs at the United 
States Coast Guard, National Transport Safety 
Board, and Canadian Transport Accident Investi­
gation Safety Board.
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MARITIME ACTIVITIES AND CASUALTIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
By v?ay of statistical data and analysis, this Chapter 
v/ill give a clear picture about the flow of maritime 
activities and casualties in the Philippines. First, 
attempts will be made to answer questions leading to 
proof that the archipelagic country is a maritime poten­
tial. Such queries are: What is the volume in tonnage of
the Philippine merchant fleet?; and, how and to what 
extent does the shipping industry influence the national 
economy?. Then, the figures as to the marine casualty 
rates shall be accounted for. Likev/ise, case reports on 
some marine accidents, which have attracted much public 
attention, shall be cited. The probable contributory fac­
tors to these accidents will be identified herein. All 
these are essentially relevant and material information, 
preliminary to the main subject matter - that is, the 
Marine Casualty Investigation System in the Philippines.
1. The Philippine Merchant Fleet
1.1 Domestic Operating Fleet
MARINA'S inventory shows a total domestic shipping 
fleet of 8.798 ships as of 1987 (table 1) with a gross
1
Table 1
Domestic Operating Fleet, 1987
Vessel Type No. of Ships Total GRT
passenger cargo 206 33561.90
passenger ferries 209 63069.90






Others a/ 811 156021.40
Total 8796 946079.00




tonnage of 946.079; the three largest groups of which 
were general cargo, fishing vessels, and barges amounting 
totally to 84.69% and, of these, fishing vessels accounted 
for over 50%. In terms of GRT, general cargo vessels 
accounted for the largest share, 29.10%, followed by 
barges and fishing vessels representing 22.66% and 16.70%, 
respectively.
There v/ere 71 major domestic shipping companies ope­
rating as of September 1982 — 21 of which were engaged in 
liner operations and lighterage, and the rest in tramping. 
The liner fleet was dominated by the Conference of Inter­
island Shipovmers and Operators (CTSO) - member companies, 
consisting of 17 member lines ovming at least 75% of the 
domestic liner fleets. In 1975, liner tonnage comprised 
27% of the total fleet but, in the early 80s, it decreased 
to 25%. On the otherhand, tramp tonnage capability 
increased from 55% to 63% v?ithin the same period.
Most of the ships had been imported second-hand from 
Japan and most of these were antiquated. In table 2, it 
can clearly be observed that the age of Philippine domes­
tic vessels fall in the 20 to 25 years bracket, with the 
exception of passenger containers/RoRo which are just a 
mere 11 years. The latest figures (table 2) show that 
of the total number of 1iner .vessels operated by CISO, 39% 
is accounted for by cargo container vessels, followed by 
passenger breakbulk and passenger container vessels repre­
senting 26% and 15%, respectively.
The fleet, which consisted mostly of conventional
2
TRBLE 2
NUMBER, TONNAGES AND AVERAGE AGE OF VESSELS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO TYPES f
OPERATED BY Cl SO MEMBER S OF DECEMBER 31 1989 COMPANIES
T Y P E S NUMBER
OF VESSEL
G R T N R T OUT AVERAGEAGE
PASS FINGER-BREAK BULK 25 21.739,43 9.803.66 1 2, 280,68 25. 52PASSENGER-CONTAINER 17 4 0, 472.65 20, 231 . 41 31,509.55 21.62
PASSENGER-BREAK BULK/CONTA1NER 1 2, 863.60 1,108,30 1,982.302/
23. 00
3/
CARGO-BREAK BULK 1 1 9, 992.87 6, 029.32 1 0, 072.08 22. 704/
CARGO-CONTAINER H4 10 7, 132.95 6 8, 938.78 171,751,45 20. 02
PASS FINGER-BREAK BULK/RORO 4 3, 656.73 1, 672.75 2, 626.695/
20. 25
6/
PASSENGER-CONTAINER/RORO 1 2 64 080,45 32 540.17 2 3, 224.94 16. 60CONTAINER/RORO 1 2, 347,87 813.81 3, 249.06 10. 00NO INFORMATION 1 6„ 523,23 3, 672.25 ■N, A. N. A,
TOTAL 1 16 25 8, 809. 78 1 44, 81 0. 45 256, 696.75
1/ For 24 vess0 Is 0 n 1 r
2/ For 8 V e s s 0 Is 0 n 1 V
3/ For 10 V0SS 0 Is 0 n 1 r4/ •For 41 V0SS 0 Is 0 n 1 r
5/ For 11 V0SS 0 Is 0 n 1 r
6/ For 10 V0SS 0 Is 0 n 1 r
types in 1975, developed with the acquisition of several 
container vessels and the conversion of some conventional 
types into semi- or fully-containerized vessels.
Containerization for interisland trade was started in 
the Philippines by the Aboitiz Shipping Corporation. As 
of 1987, there were 52 fully and semi-containerized 
vessels owned by CISC member companies serving the domes­
tic trade (table 3). At present, a majority of the ships 
currently used for domestic container operation in the 
country have been converted from general cargo or lumber 
carriers, which were similarly imported second-hand from 
Japan. The domestic container vessels are relatively 
small compared to international ships such that their 
capacities only range from 48 to 236 TEUs, the lengths 
betv/een 67 to 107 meters, and depths just under 6 meters. 
Most of them lack adequate shipborne equipment, like 
derricks, for container operation. There are a good 
number of them which handle non-standard containers. In 
terms of per vessel capacity, therefore, there is much to 
be desired from the country's existing fleet of domestic 
container vessels, and this limits the efficiency in hand­
ling large volumes of cargo per trip per vessel. Another 
limitation is the fact that their speeds, which are 
usually between 11 to 14 knots, are also relatively slow 
by international standards.
Aside from the CISO vessels, which generally cater to 
long-distance routes (200 NM or more), there is a large 
fleet of short-distance passenger-cargo ferries mainly 
domestically-built and wooden-hulled. From 1987, MARINA
3
Table 3
Container Fleet as of 1987




















records show a fleet of 310 ferries. The term 'Ferry' as 
applied here covers ships of 15 to 250 GRT on routes under 
4 hours and also includes a few larger - ships on short 
routes.
1.2 Overseas Fleet
The structure of the overseas shipping fleet in 1969 
may be illustrated by the nature of the vessels comprising 
it. Bulk carriers are the most numerous, comprising 63% 
of the total and about 18% are general cargo ships (table 
4) .
In 1975, there v/ere only 25 registered Filipino com­
panies engaged in overseas shipping. To date, there are 
about 185 such companies. From a total of 62 registered 
vessels in 1975, the Philippine merchant fleet grew to 427 
in 1989. In terms of total deadv?eight capacity, the fleet 
likewise expanded to 16 times its size from .878 million 
tons to 14.16 million tons over the same period. The ave­
rage size of vessels of 8,955 dwt tons in 1975 had 
increased to 17,570 dwt tons in 1981. As to age. 
Filipino-registered vessels averaged 16.05 years in 1978, 
11.63 years in 1981, and 8.63 years in 1989.
This indication of a relatively younger fleet has 
been largely influenced by keen competition for such ves­
sels and by the requirement of age of vessels for 




RP Overseas Fleet By Type of Vessel 
1986-1989
Type of Vessel 1986 1987 1968 1989
Bulk Carrier 453 208 278 298 269
General Cargo 1,2 90 87 67 76
Tanker 16 17 12 13
Multi-purpose Carrier 16 13 11 9
Car carrier 8 12 14 19
Livestock Carrier 11 10 5 10
Log Carrier 19 17 15 1
Others 1) 29 35 53 39
Total 397 469 472 427
1) Includes reefer vessels , OBO/COBO, RORO-■cont;ainer
vessels
and a few others.
Source of basic data: MARINA
2. The Economic Significance
Transportation is considered as a basic component in 
the development of the economy. In an archipelagic set­
ting like that in the Philippines, the need for a 
developed maritime transportation system, being the 
cheapest and most logical means of moving goods and people 
from one place to another, is very essential. Thus, the 
industry plays a vital role in promoting inter-regional 
trade and economic integration. It contributes to the 
growth in business and industries.
The development of shipping, therefore, is a reflect­
ion of the overall economic climate. Records of the 
National Census and Statistics Office indicate that the 
shipping industry accounted for 25% of the country's total 
coastv/ise trade. Given the 5% projected annual growth of 
the economy, industry sources predict that cargo volume 
will rise annually by 7% until the year 2000. The increa­
sing trend of cargo traffic is reflective of the improve­
ment in the economy and the increase in interisland 
trading activities. Shipping is an extended arm of pro­
duction and marketing abroad, which constitutes an import­
ant infrastructure of the country's economy. It generates 
foreign exchange earnings and the potential ability to en­
hance the competitiveness of Philippine exports and reduce 
the negative effects of the country's import trade through 
adequate and efficient costs.
Philippine external t 
moved on a tramp/bulk rather 
to 1974, Philippine flag
rade has always 








TOP TEN C10> CRRFilERS OF PHILIPPINE EXPORTS 
(E.O.E, VRLUE IN US DOLLARS)
1983 AND 1988
NAT 10 N ALT Y
0 F
CARRIER
19 8 9 19 8 8
RANK V A L U E V. SHARE RANK VRLUE ■/. SHARE
Panama n1 an 1 1 010,064,268 17,15 1 1,174,954,854 22, 17
Rmer1 can oaU 96,8, 515, 86 9 16,45 2 870, 353, 782 16, 42
F 1 1 i p i n 0 3 836, 539, 94 6 14,21 vJ 679, 753, 253 12. 82
S 1 n q Q p 0 r e a n ' H 469, 6 52, 53 3 7 , 98 4 331,532,148 • 6. 25
J a p a n e s e 5 367 6 42, 148 6,24 7 22 5, 404, 080 4. 25
L1 her 1 an 6 265, 4 37, 93 7 4 , 51 5 31 0, 961,638 5. 87
Chinese (PROC) 7 242, 9 28, 91 3 4,13 8 21 1,083, 946 3. 98
TaiHan ese 8 228, 2 62, 162 3,88 10 164,404,310 3. 10
Dan 1sh 9 190, 0 54, 54 8 3,23.
German (FFD.) 10 176, 3 36, 03 6 2,99
Others 1, 132, 667, 88 7 19,24 907, 350, 620 17,12
Korean ' 6 256, 793, 956 4,84
Antig u 0 n 9 167, 740, 863 3,16
TOTAL 5, 888, 1 02, 24 7 100,00 5, 300, 333, 450 100
Source : Trade Branch, NSO Note rcraf t
Philippine trade volume; the balance of 92.2% was carried 
by foreign flag lines. In 1981, Philippine flag vessels 
registered a total carriage volume of 15% of the total 
Philippine foreign trade. In terms of value carried, Phi­
lippine flag vessels carried 17.8% in 1974 but by the end 
of the third quarter of 1981, the total value of trade 
moved up to the amount of 21%.
Table 5 shows the top ten carriers of Philippine 
exports by watercraft in 1988 and 1989. For the two-year 
period, the Philippine flag carriers only ranked third 
with only 14.21% share in 1989. First and second were Pa­
namanian and American vessels with 17.15% and 16.45% 
shares, respectively.
On the import side, Philippine flag carriers account­
ed for just 14.58% of the total value; the 85.42% was 
carried by foreign flag lines with the Panamanian vessels 
representing 19.10% of the total imports (table 6).
Containerization v/as started in 1976 with only one 
vessel having a capacity of 120 TEUs. In 1978, con­
tainerized cargo accounted for 3.6% of the country's total 
domestic trade in terms of metric tons. A significant in­
crease was noted in 1981 when containerized cargo amounted 
to a total domestic trade equivalent of 21.5%.
The growth of container trade in TEUs over a seven- 
year period (1974-1981) posed a positive indication. Re­
gistering an average annual increase of 20.28% for export 
cargoes and 24.86% for import commodities, total TEUs
6
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TOP Tf-N ( 10'l CflRl'MiriO I'JI PHILIPPINE IMPORTS 
(F.O.B. Vni IJI IN US DOLLRRS)
■I'ljO'T an.rr988
NOT I 0 N FI L 1 T Y
0 F
C B R R 1 E R RANK V f’l
Panotiani an 1 1 , G
F1 h p1 no z
fi ri e r 1 con 3 •*
Sinqaporeon 4 f.'
Liberi on 5 j
Japanese 6 'I
Toiwan ese 7 'I
Chinese (PROC) 8
R u s s1 on S
Greek 1 0 1-
K 0 r e 0 n





■ ■/ SHARE RANK VALUE SHARE
V'J ;87 19. 10 1 1/101, 158, 525 22.18
6 34 14. 58 2 940, 481,912 14.89
3/ 521 9, 27 4 461,114,946 7.30
18 7 85 7, 52 5 445, 907, 271 7.06
■TL 628 7.11 3 577, 283, 481 9.14
T3, 7 27 5. 32 9 244.959,402 3.88
T2 012 5. 06 6 274,199,210 4.34
/T, 629 4.41 8 259,077,945 4.10
•L3. 6 69 2.91 10 192,807,534 3.05
■Jf.i 957 2. 87
4.017 253, 533, 022
ILL 5 62 21 . 85 1,266, 698, 600 20.05
12, 91 1 100, 00 6, 31 7, 141,848 100.00
Source Trade Bronch, NSO Hate rcraf t
handled amounted to 98.243 in 1974 increasing by 158% in 
1980. The structural shift of Philippine export cargoes 
from raw materials to semi-processed and processed cargoes 
promises greater growth rates in this direction.
3. Marine Casualties
Shipping is a service-oriented industry. The ship­
owners guarantee safe and comfortable travel in exchange 
for the money paid by the shipper or passenger. The obli­
gation of the shipovmer starts at the time the passenger 
sets foot on the gangplank up to the time the said 
passenger disembarks from the vessel at its destination. 
Similarly, the obligation of the shipowner starts from the 
time the cargo is loaded on to the vessel and ends when 
the said cargo is discharged at its intended destination. 
Attached to such great responsibilities are equally great 
uncertainties.
More often than not, hov/ever, it is always the ship­
owner who is likely to be blamed when sea mishaps occur - 
substandard vessels, poor life saving facilities, inexper­
ienced and inefficient crew, etc. These are the usual 
criticisms against the poor shipowners.
If one takes a look at the whole set-up, however, one 
gradually comes to realize that it is not only the 
shipowner that is to blame. The maritime administration, 
the Coast Guard, the shipbuilder, the classification 
societies, even the shippers and passengers have their 
share of responsibilities. Poor implementation of safety
7
regulations is often the root of the tragedies.
The Philippines, which is more maritime-oriented than 
many nations in the world, can be said to have experienced 
sensational tragedies in its waters. MVs "Don Juan", 
"Dona Marilyn" and "Dona Paz" accidents are dust a few of 
the marine casualties that have claimed thousands of lives 
and are now recorded as the worst disasters in the history 
of the Philippine seas. In addition, strangely, safety 
regulations were rigidly imposed immediately after the 
occurrence and then these slowly died a natural death 
until such time as another accident happened; in which 
case, the same regulations were passed but the cycle moved 
on.
Table 7 shows the number of domestic vessels and per­
sons involved in marine casualties in 1988 and 1989. The 
number of accidents from 1988 to 1989 increased by 34%. 
The only favorable indication in the statistics, although 
not really, is the reduction in the rate of casualties. 
The accidents took 1,836 persons in 1989, 29% less than 
the 1988 figure of 2,502 people. Vessels referred to in 
the chart ranged from 10 GRT and above and were involved 
in minor and major accidents.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that, in most 
of Philippine marine accidents, the vessels involved could 
be said to be either overloaded/overcapacity or too old to 
be safe to sail, or both; and that, normally, even the 
actual total number of passengers as v/ell as the exact fi­
gure of lost lives could not be ascertained afterv;ards.
8
TRBLE 7
NUMBER OF DOMESTIC VESSELS RHD PERSONS 
INVOLVED IN MRRITIME CRSURLITIES 
1989 AND 1988























SEARCH AND RESCUE ACTIVITIES
No. of Persons Rescued
No. of Persons Missing







TOTAL 1,836 2, 502
Source : Philippine Coast Guard
Following is a reproduction of some reported marine 
cases in Philippine waters or involving Philippine fleets 
(which were noted as some of the worst sea disaster in the 
world history), taken from Modern Shipping Disasters 
(1963-1987), by Hooke.
ALOHA. motor general cargo vessel; Cotabato Shipping Coi 
ration; 494.
While en route from Cotabato to Iloilo carrying over 
330 passengers and a general cargo, as well as 11-man 
crew, the Philippine inter-island motor vessel Aloha 
•caught fire and sank off Zamboanga, south-western Mindanao 
Island, on June 2, 1974. With a total of 311 passengers 
and crew reported to have been rescued, the death toll was 
put at 33 but, as is the case of most Philippine shipping 
disasters, the exact number of lives lost will never be 
known because the total number of passengers actually be­
ing carried at the time could not be determined after­
wards.
ANGELINA STAR. motor general cargo vessel; Philippine 
Star Forwarders, Inc.; 1962; Fukushima Zosensho, Mat- 
sue; 933; 65.69x9.86x5.01 metres.
The Philippine motor vessel Angelina Star was last 
reported when she sailed from Keeluhg at 9 a.m. on Decem­
ber 11, 1979, bound for Manila, loaded with a general car­
go that included copper wire. However, during the morning 
of December 15, the motor container vessel Asia Ace and 
the motor vessel Loch Maree reported sighting an uninflat­
9
on it.ed 25-man liferaft with the name "Angelina Star" 
plus a lifejacket and a body that was subsequently identi­
fied as being that of the 2nd engineer of the vessel. Ge­
neral wreckage, hatchboards and assorted debris was also 
located in the same area, lat.23 lO'N. long.119 53'E. off 
the west coast of Taiwan. A search was instigated by the 
Taiwan Air Force but no trace of the vessel was found. She 
was presumed to have sunk with the loss of all hands. 
Fishing vessels subsequently reported sighting several de- 
"composed bodies in the area where the Angelina Star was 
believed to have been lost.
ATLANTIC. motor general cargo vessel; Aligben Lines,Inc; 
641 .
While en route from Toledo, Cebu Island, to Surigao 
City, loaded with gypsum/ferti1izer in bulk, the Philip­
pine inter-island motor vessel Atlantic sank off Masapelid 
Island in lat.09 40'N, long.125 40'E, on September 2, 1984
due to the severe weather conditions created by typhoon 
"Ike". There were only five survivors.
DON CARLOS. motor general cargo vessel; Sulpicio Lines, 
Inc; 1944; USA;707;66.91x9.50x4.70 metres.
The 33-year old Philippine motor vessel Don Carlos 
sank off Gango, near Ozamis City, on July 29, 1977.
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DON CARLOS GOTHONG- motor general cargo vessel; Carlos A. 
Gothong Lines,Inc; 1949; Burmeister & Wain, Copenhagen; 
2,918;94.67x14.05x9.02 metres.
The 29-year old Philippine motor vessel Don Carlos 
Gothong was declared a constructive total loss after she 
capsized and sank in Cebu harbour on October 12, 1978.
DON ERVIN. motor general cargo vessel; Lorenzo Shipping 
Corporation; 1955; Namura Shipbuilding Co.,Ltd, Osaka; 
1,038; 64.52x10.04x5.52 metres.
While en route from Manila to Ozamis City, Mindanao 
Island, loaded v/ith a general cargo, the Philippine inter­
island motor vessel Don Ervin listed and sank 1V4 miles 
south of Corcuera Light, Simara Island, on July 25, 1980,
due to the severe weather conditions and rough seas creat­
ed by typhoon "Kim". All on board safely abandoned ship 
and managed to reach Tacasan, Corcuera, Simara Island, on 
board the vessel's motor,launch and inflatable liferaft.
DON FRANCISCO. motor general cargo vessel; Lorenzo Ship­
ping Corporation; 1944; J.K.Welding Co., Inc., Yonkers; 
683;50.69x9.76 metres.
While en route from Manila to Davao, loaded v/ith a 
general cargo, the Philippine inter-island motor vessel 
Don Francisco ran aground off Banton Island on April 21, 
1978, during typhoon "Olive". With her cargo hold and 
engine-room completely flooded, the wrecked vessel was 
abandoned as a constructive total loss.
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DON JUAN. motor passenger/general cargo ferry; Negros Na­
vigation Co., Inc,; 1971; Niigata Engineering Co., Ltd. 
Niigata; 2,311; 95.66x13.85x7.70 metres.
According to local Press reports, over 1,000 persons 
died when the Philippine inter-island motor ferry Don Juan 
sank in thr Tablas Strait off Mindoro Island in lat.l2 50' 
54"N, long. 121 54'02"E. at 10:30 p.m. on April 22, 1980,
only 15 minutes after a collision with the Philippine 
motor tank barge Tacloban City. This tragic loss of life 
not only made the Don Juan the worst maritime disaster of 
1980 but also one of the worst of all time.
The Don Juan was en route from Manila to Bacolod, Ne­
gros Island, carrying 890 officially listed passengers and 
110 crev7-member s, a total of exactly 1,000, while the Tac­
loban City, on which there v;as no loss of life, v/as en 
route to Bataan, in ballast, at the time of the disaster, 
which occurred in calm seas and under a bright moon off 
Maestre de Campo Island. About 500 survivors v/ere report­
ed to have been rescued by the motor tanker Laoag City, 
which took them to Batangas , while many others v/ere picked 
up by the Tacloban City, which then also proceeded to Ba­
tangas. Numerous vessels and aircraft searched the area 
for survivors during the follov/ing day but the vast majo­
rity had already been picked up during the hours of dark­
ness, with several of the survivors reportedly in a ser­
ious condition.
As appears to be the case in so many Philippine 
passenger-carrying vessels, the exact number of persons on
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board will never be known but the owners of the Don Juan 
stated that 896 persons were eventually rescued, while 121 
bodies were reported to have been recovered. The owners 
admitted that latecomers and many small children may well 
not have been included in the official list of passengers.
The master of the Don Juan filed an official protest, 
stating that his vessel had twice changed course in an ef­
fort to avoid a collision. He added that the tanker had 
also changed course, with the result that the tanker's bow 
struck the ferry. The master of the Tacloban City, cross­
filing, stated that it was the ferry that was to blame, 
accusing her crew of negligence, lack of foresight and 
reckless manoeuvering. He said that it had been the ferry 
which had struck his tanker's starboard bov7.
The scene of this disaster was less than 40 miles 
from the site of the world's worst-ever peacetime maritime 
tragedy, which involved the loss of another Philippine 
passenger-carrying inter-island vessel, the Dona Paz, in 
December, 1987, as a result of which a horrifying total of 
4,386 lives were officially recorded as being lost. The 
strait between Marinduque Island and Mindoro Island is the 
busiest sea-land in the Philippines, with all inter-island 
vessels bound to or from Manila to the Visayas Islands and 
Mindoro having to pass that way. There was also another 
similarity in both cases with regard to the number of 
lives reported, at first, to have been lost. With the. 
vast majority of those subsequently reported to have been 
on board the Dona Paz not listed on official passenger
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wi thlists, her original death toll was put at over 1,500 
the possibility that it could, in fact, have been over 
2,000. However, when relatives of those on Board notified 
officials of the fact, the final death toll from the Dona 
Paz was put at 4,375, with another 11 crewmen being lost 
from the colliding vessel, the motor tanker Vector.
DON VICTORIANO I. motor general cargo vessel; Sulpicio 
Lines, Inc.; 1944; 769.
The 38-year-old Philippine motor vessel Don Victoria- 
no I was on an inter-island voyage from Davao to Butuan, 
carrying a general cargo, when she ran aground off Banco 
Point, east coast of Mindanao Island, on April 4-5, 1982. 
When she began to break up. she was abandoned by the 
salvors as a total loss.
DONA CASSANDRA. motor passenger/general cargo vessel; 
Carlos A. Go Thong Lines; 1967; Hashihama Zosen, Imaba- 
ri ; 487; 53.80x11.00x3.79 metres.
At least 168 persons died when the Philippine inter­
island motor passenger/cargo vessel Dona Cassandra capsi­
zed and sank in Nasipit Bay pff the north-eastern tip of 
Mindoro Island on November 21, 1983, during the extremely 
sever weather conditions created by typhoon "Orchid".
The Dona Cassandra, which had sailed from Butuan City 
in Mindoro, for the 14-hour journey to Cebu City, v/as car­
rying a manifested 348 passengers and 48 crew as vrell as a 
cargo of lumber v/hich had shifted in stormy seas. A total
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of 219 survivors were picked up from the many small is­
lands in the area as well as from lifeboats but, as with 
many Philippine shipping disasters, the true number of 
persons actually on board at the time will never be known.
DONA CONCHITA. motor general cargo vessel; .Carlos A. Go 
Thong & Co.; 1944; 683.
The Philippine motor vessel Dona Conchita was en 
route from Butuan to Manila laden with plywood and a 
general cargo when she ran aground off Fortune Island in 
the vicinity of Nasugbu, Batangas, on August 1, 1972. All 
the crew and passengers on board were safely rescued from 
the wrecked vessel, which subsequently broke in two.
DONA JOSEFINA. roll -on, roll-off motor ferry; Carlos A.Go 
Thong Lines, Inc.; 1968; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 
Ltd., Shimonoseki; 991;71.56x13.01x4.81 metres.
A total of 194 lives v/ere lost when the Philippine 
inter-island roll-on, roll-off motor ferry Dona Josefina 
sank in the Visayan Sea off Sacay Point, Leyte Island, at 
about 4 a.m. on April 24, 1986, after listing and taking
on water. She was on voyage from Cebu to Manila at the 
time and had only just sailed from the port of Isabel, Ley 
te, where she had loaded 679 tonnes of copper cathodes. Of 
the 364 passengers and 50 crew on board, only 220 were 
rescued.
In any "normal" year, this v/ould probably have been 
the greatest maritime tragedy in terms of loss of life but
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1986 was far from being normal. Just over four months la­
ter, on August 31, 423 Soviet citizens died when the
Russian passenger vessel Admiral Nakhimov sank following a 
collision when on a Black Sea cruise.
DONA PAZ. motor ferry/general cargo vessel; Sulpicio 
Lines, Inc.; 1963; Onomichi Zosen K.K., Onomichi; 
2,3324; 93.10x13.64x8.06 metres.
The world's worst-ever maritime disaster occurred 
during the late evening of December 20, 1987, when the
2,324 tons gross Philippine inter-island motor ferry Dona 
Paz collided v/ith the 629 tons gross Philippine coastal 
motor tanker Vector in the Sibuyan Sea, central Philip­
pines. Both vessels immediately caught fire v/hen a fire­
ball flashed between them and then, when completely .gut­
ted, both subsequently sank, at a depth of 530 metres. A 
staggering total of 4,386 men, v/omen and children lost
their lives as a result of this catastrophe.
/
The Dona Paz, v?hich was built at Onomichi, Japan, in 
1963, began life as the Japanese-flag Himeyuri Maru. 
After trading in Japanese waters for some 12 years she was 
sold to Filipino interests in 1975, her name being changed 
to Don Sulpicio. It v/as under the name Don Sulpicio that, 
on June 5, 1979, she was gutted by a fire while en route 
from Manila to Cebu, while carrying over 1,100 passengers, 
64 crew and a general cargo. The fire was reportedly 
caused by a lighted cigarette butt being carelessly throvm 
into the cargo hold some seven hours after departure from 
Manila. However, all 1,164 persons on board were rescued
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without loss but the seriously damaged vessel, which was 
beached off the Batangas coast, was declared a construct­
ive total loss due to the severity of the damage. The 
wreck was subsequently repurchased from the underwriters 
by her original owners, Sulpicio Lines, who decided to 
have the vessel repaired and refurbished for further use 
on the inter-island passenger trade. With the extensive 
repairs having duly been completed, the newly-renamed Dona 
Paz was returned to service.
It was while she v/as en route from Tacloban, Leyte 
Island, to Manila, with an intermediate stop at Catbalo- 
gan, Samar, carrying thousands of passengers, many of whom 
were due to visit relatives for the Christmas holiday per­
iod, that the Dona Paz was involved in the most catastro­
phic collision the world has ever known. This occurred at 
about 10 p.m. on December 20, 1987, when she was reported­
ly hit by the motor tanker Vector, in the Tablas Strait 
off Dumali Point, eastern coast of Mindoro Island, in what 
is the busiest sea-lane in the whole of the more than 
7,000-island archipelago that makes up the Philippines. 
All inter-island ships bound for Manila from Visayan Is­
lands of the central Philippines and the southern island 
of Mindanao, and vice versa, have to pass through this 
narrow 18-mile v/ide channel between Marinduque Island and 
Mindoro Island.
The Vector, which had a crew of 13, was proceeding 
from Batangas. south-western Luzon, to Masbate, central 
Philippines, carrying a cargo of 8,800 barrels of petro­
leum products. The impact of the co11ision started an im­
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mediate blazing inferno on both vessels, with the fire be­
ing fed by the tanker's highly inflammable cargo. Both 
vessels subsequently sank but it was the Dona Paz that was 
to go down in the annals of maritime history as the 
world's worst-ever peace-time case of loss of life at sea. 
Only 24 of her passengers and none of her crew survived, 
while only two of the Vector's 13-man crew escaped from 
the raging fire. At first, the figures for the actual 
number of passengers being carried on the Dona Paz was put 
at 1,495, with 58 crewmen also on board, but with constant 
revisions being made v;hen relatives found that members of 
their family had been on the Dona Paz, unmanifested, the 
final passenger death toll was put at an almost unbelieva­
ble 4,317. Added to this figure v?as her complete 58-man 
crew, making a total of 4,375 deaths on the Dona Paz, and 
11 dead crew of the Vector, givihg a complete death toll 
amounting to a massive 4,386 persons, men, women and 
children. The authorities stated that there had only been 
1,586 manifested passengers, v/^ith another 2,755 unmanifes­
ted being on board. One survivor estimated that there had 
been over 1,000 children on the vessel, all of whom pe­
rished in the inferno. Only 275 bodies were reported to 
have been recovered. Most of these were found washed 
ashore along the coastline of Oriental Mindoro, while a 
few were located on beaches in Batangas Province. It was 
assumed that the vast majority of the persons on both ves­
sels would have been completely consumed by the intense 
heat, there being little, if any, trace of their cindered 
bodies.
As is common with many Philippine inter-island pas­
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senger ships, names of people with complimentary tickets, 
children under four years of age who are given free pass­
age and those who actually buy tickets on board ship are 
not listed in the passenger manifests. Extra tickets were 
usually bought illegally on board ship at a cheaper rate, 
with the fares going into the pockets of the crew. This 
is what led to the confusion over the actual number of 
passengers on board, added to which the Dona Paz was only 
certified to carry 1,518 passengers. She v/as , without 
doubt, massively overloaded.
Survivors of the disaster said they were all looking 
forward to a happy Christmas in Manila with members of 
their families v^hen, in what seemed to be an instant, they 
found their ship on fire. Samuel Carillo, one of the 26 
picked up alive by a passing vessel and brought to Manila, 
said that he was walking to the canteen v/hen he felt a 
violent jerk and heard an explosion. "I went up on deck 
and there were flames everywhere. I jumped overboard", he 
added. Another survivor, Paquilo Osabel, 42, said that 
the vessel was so overcrov/ded that up to four people v;ere 
sharing individual beds and hundreds of others were sit­
ting on the floor of the three-deck ship, unable to find a 
seat. Osabel said that he was talking to his sister and 
three teenage nieces, all of whom were lost, when he heard 
an explosion. "I went to the window to see what had hap­
pened and I saw the sea in flames," he said. "I shouted 
to my family that there was a fire but the fire spread so 
rapidly that there were flames everywhere.' People v^'ere 
screaming and jumping overboard. The smoke v/as terrible. 
We couldn't see each other. All I could see were the 
flames. I just jumped into the sea."
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A 15-year-old survivor, who suffered severe burns to 
his face and arms, said he was asleep but woke up when he 
heard the noise and panic. "I dumped into the burning 
sea. There were no lights, no life vests and no orders 
were being given." He lost his mother and two sisters. 
Another survivor claimed that the cabinets containing the 
life vests were locked.
Severino Carreon, a bus conductor from Catbalogan, 
claimed that the Dona Paz was so "Jammed” with passengers 
that he had to sleep on deck while three other members of 
his family managed to find a space three floors below. "I 
heard a very loud explosion. It woke me up and I saw the 
fire." Carreon, who was taking his relatives to spend 
Christmas in Manila with a brother of his, said that the 
oil tanker had ploughed directly into the mid-section of 
the Dona Paz before exploding, releasing the highly flam­
mable petrol cargo over both vessels. "Then I Jumped into 
the water and swam for some hours praying that a ship 
v/ould save me.
However, another survivor, Salvador Bacsal, a fisher­
man from Eastern Samar, thought that it v;as the Dona Paz 
that had rammed the tanker, with both vessels bursting 
into flames upon impact and the sea becoming a raging 
inf erno.
The 26 survivors were all picked up by another inter­
island passenger vessel, the Don Claudio, v/hich took them 
to Manila for medical treatment to their burns injuries. 
The master of the Don Claudio, Captain Melecio Barranco, 
said that he had seen a fire from a distance of about
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eight miles and began steaming towards the scene. "We saw 
big flames as high as a 10-storey building and lots of 
black smoke, just like a building being on fire", Captain 
Barranco said. "We arrived at 10:30 p.m. and made sure 
that it was a ship on fire. We also guessed that there 
was a tanker involved because the water smelled of oil." 
He added that the Dona Paz burned until shortly after mid­
night before sinking, while the Vector went dovm two hours 
later. The crew of the Don Claudio scanned the darkened 
waters for some three and a half hours before they gave up 
hope of finding any more persons alive. United States Air 
Force helicopters that subsequently went to the scene 
fbund no survivors, nor any signs of debris. "It was as 
if it had never happened", a US Air Force spokesman said.
Because the Dona Paz had no radio and therefore no 
distress messages could be sent from her, maritime offi­
cials acknov/ledged that they did not learn of the col­
lision until over eight hours after it had occurred and it 
then took another eight hours to organize search and res­
cue operations because it had taken that amount of time to 
obtain enough information on the incident and to which 
area to send the first two search helicopters. Even then, 
they returned without any sighting at all "and", said the 
the director of the Manila Rescue Coordination Centre, 
whose office did not learn that the tv;o vessels had colli­
ded and sank until. 7 a.m. on Monday, nine hours later, 
"probably we were given the wrong coordinates". The au­
thorities blamed poor communications, geography, lack of 
organization, shortage of trained personnel, inefficiency, 
lack of finances, and a host of other reasons for what was
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described as "the frequent foul-ups" that occur in Philip­
pine maritime operations.
Senior Coast Guard officials were subsequently dis­
missed with the possible threat of a court martial fol­
lowing the disaster. Coast Guard commanders in four 
districts were replaced and 16 other officers were re­
assigned after a board of inquiry found negligence within 
the Coast Guard Organization had been a contributory fac­
tor to the tragedy. The detailed Coast Guard inquiry 
findings \rere not made public but their action was taken 
as a tacit admission that the ferry was badly overcrowded, 
having been allowed to sail in such a condition being a 
violation of the statutory procedures for granting depar­
ture clearances to ferries.
Shipping officials representing the owners of both 
the Dona Paz and the Vector blamed each other for the 
tragedy. Captain Plutarco Bawagan, vice-president of 
Sulpicio Lines, told a five-man inquiry panel that he was 
convinced that the Vector had rammed his vessel. He 
claimed that the Dona Paz had a special bulkhead to keep 
her afloat if she hit another ship but he thought that the 
ferry had been hit amidships-, as reported by some survi­
vors. But Mr. Jose Sison, an attorney representing Vector 
Shipping Corporation, argued that the Vector had an even 
bigger collision bulkhead, as is normal for a tanker, as 
well as other equipment to cushion any impact. He main­
tained that the tanker wa.s only travelling at 5.5 knots 
and if that vessel had rammed the Dona Paz, there would 
have'been no explosion.
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The owners of the Dona Paz subsequently increased in­
surance claims payments from pesos 20,000 to pesos 30,000 
per life lost. In pounds sterling terms, this equated to 
about 822 per person. However, they still maintained that 
their vessel was not at fault, the tanker having to take 
the full blame for the catastrophe. Indeed in November, 
1988, a Philippine marine inquiry issued a report stating 
that the Vector had been responsible for the collision, 
calling the tanker a "floating hazard to navigation".
XXKKXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
The scene of the disaster was less than 40 miles from 
where the Philippines' previous v/orst maritime catastrophe 
had occurred on April 22, 1980, when over 1,000 lives v/ere 
lost as a result of an almost identical collision involv­
ing the motor passenger ferry Don Juan and the oil tanker 
Tacloban City.
There is hardly a year goes by v/ithout a maritime 
tragedy occurring in the Philippines but Feliciana G. Sa- 
longa, president of the Philippine Shipyard and Engineer­
ing Corporation, stated in April, 1988, that the annual 
death toll at sea in the Philippines v;as an incredible 
40,000. However, other Philippine authorities said that 
this was too high and put it nearer 20,000 to 30,000 (in 
one yearf). Apparently such losses are rarely reported 
because they are an aggregation of, mostly, small events. 
During 1987, the statistics for those passengers listed 
on manifests alone as having travelled on local ferries 
was put at 11 million.
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This extremely high number of deaths at sea is mainly 
because of the Philippines being a 7,000-island nation, of 
which 880 are inhabited, with a population of approximate­
ly 50 million. Literally hundreds of lives are lost every 
week from small accidents and "man overboard" situations. 
Among the more serious shipping accidents during 1987 were 
the loss of at least 51 passengers from a total of 188 
when a motor launch sank off Siquijor on July 18, another 
25 lives being lost when a motor banca struck a bridge in 
Pagalungan, Maguindanaoon July 5, a further 70 being lost 
when another banca capsized off Buenavista, Bohol, on 
January 17, v/ith at least 25 persons drowning v/hen a motor 
launch capsized off Sibutu, Tawi-Tawi, on January 16. Only 
the previous year, the motor ferry Dona Josefina had sunk 
with the loss of 194 lives in the Camotes Sea off Isabel, 
Leyte, on April 25, 1986, while, as mentioned above, over 
1,000 men, women and children died v^’hen the Don Juan sank 
following a collision v;ith the Tacloban City in April, 
1980. Loss of life at sea is apparently a way of life in 
the Philippines.
The Filipino fleet includes about 100 passenger-cargo 
ships more than 250 tons gross, such as the Dona Paz, 200 
or so ferries of less than 250 tons plus thousands more 
barges and small vessels plying short routes. Many are 
considered to be "antiquated". Mr. Salonga acknowledged 
that the appalling disregard for safety in his country and 
the unseaworthiness of many vessels was something that had 
been talked about for years but, until the Dona Paz catas­
trophe, no one had seemed to want to do anything about the 





s, with passengers being so desperate to get on 
inter-island ferries that the last thing on 





MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATION SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINE
This Chapter will discuss fully the present marine 
casualty investigation system in' the Philippines. The 
structural as well as the procedural framev/orks thereof 
shall be pointed out and explained in detail. As a result, 
one can easily determine whether the existing system is 
already appropriate and adequate or whether it needs to be 
re-structured.
Marine casualty investigations in the Philippines are 
carried out by two government offices, i. e. the Maritime 
Industry Authority and the Philippine Coast Guard.
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA)
MARINA was created on 1 June 1974 by virtue of Presi­
dential Decree 474, originally placed under the Office of 
the President, then later and up to now has been attached 
to the Department of Transportation and Communi cat ioQ>' 
(DOTC) for policy and program coordination. It was tasked 
to integrate the development, promotion and regulation of 
the maritime industry in the country. With the issuance 
of Executive Order 1011 (which abolished the Board of 
Transportation and transfered to MARINA the former's 
quasi-judic ial functions pertaining to v^ater transporta­
tion) and Executive Orders 125 and 125-A(which reorganized
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the DOTC), MARINA'S regulatory responsibility to the 
industry thereby increased.
For all intents and purposes, MARINA is the duly- 
constituted Maritime Administration in the country. In 
the carring out of its functions within administration, 
MARINA is mandated to adopt economic, legal and adminis­
trative measures to influence the position of the Philip­
pine fleet and its ancilliary industries at the national 
level and in the international market.
In order to attain its objectives, MARINA is asked:
1. To adopt and implement a practicable and coordi­
nated Maritime Industry Development Program v;hich will 
include, among others, the early replacement of obsoles­
cent and uneconomic vessels; modernization and expansion 
of the Philippine merchant fleet; enhancement of domestic 
capability for shipbuilding, repair and maintenance; and 
the development of a reservoir of trained manpov/er.
2. To provide and help provide the necessary
(2.1) financial assistance to the industry through
public and private financing institutions and ins­
truments ;
(2.2) technological assistance; and
(2.3) in general, a favorable climate for expans-
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ion of domestic and foreign investments in shipping 
enterprises.
3. To provide for the effective supervision, regula­
tion and rationalization of the organizational management, 
ownership and operations of all water transport utilities 
and other maritime enterprises.
1. Organizational Structure.
MARINA is governed by a Board, known as the Maritime 
Industry Board, and the Management.
The Board is composed of the Secretary of Transporta­
tion and Communications; the Secretary of Trade and 
Industry; the Secretary of National Defense; the General 
Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority; the Chairman of 
the Development Bank of the Philippines; and the MARINA 
Administrator. It is responsible for providing compre­
hensive policy guidelines for the development and regula­
tions of the national shipping industry. As such, the 
main tasks consist of the promulgation and prescription of 
developmental rules and regulations, standards, procedures 
and recommendations for laws and measures towards the 
growth and effective administration of maritime affairs.
On the other hand, the Management of the Authority 
is vested in the Administrator, duly assisted by the 
Deputy Administrator for Planning and the Deputy Adminis-
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trator for Operations. They directly control and super­
vise the operation of the Authority's eleven (11) line 
and staff offices and six (6) regional offices, all headed 
by Directors. (Illustration 1)
The delineated services of the line and staff and re­
gional offices are defined, as follows;
Domestic Shipping Office - Formulates, recommends and 
implements policies and guidelines relative to the econo­
mic supervision and regulation of the domestic shipping 
sector to continually improve and stimulate development of 
the industry.
Overseas Shipping Office - Formulates, recommends and 
implements policies, guidelines and criteria pertaining to 
the economic regulation of overseas shipping operations to 
enhance the country's competitive position in the carriage 
of foreign trade and cross trade.
Manpower Development Office - Establishes, develops 
and implements an effective manpower development system to 
support the current and future needs of the shipping and 
shipbuilding industries.
Registration and Licensing Office - Formulates,recom­
mends and implements the adoption of rules and regula­
tions, procedures and guidelines relating to the registra­
tion and documentation of all vessels owned/chartered by 
Philippine nationals, including the issuance of certifi­
cates incident to such registration and documentation;
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formulates, recommends and implements policies and prog­
rams for the regulation and supervision of shipbuilding, 
shiprepair and shipbreaking.
Enforcement Office - Enforces laws, rules and regula­
tions, including penalties for violations affecting water 
transportation services through an effective monitoring 
system and stringent survey/inspection program.
Technical Services Office - Undertakes technical eva­
luation of all shipping projects and research for the 
modernization of the Philippine fleet and development of 
the maritime industry; conducts vessel inspection/
surveys relative to safety and quality of shipping ser- 
vices,
Franchising Staff - Hears applications for CPC, ves­
sel re-routing, petitions for rate increase/route
allocation in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions 
over all public v/ater transportation services; performs 
all other functions of the defunct Board of Transportation 
(BOT) over water transportation service under the Public 
Service Act.
Maritime Legal Affairs Office - Provides legal advice 
and assistance to the Board and the various units of the 
Authority in the interpretation of laws and implementation 
of- rules and regulations, prosecutes violations of mari­
time and water transportation laws, represents the Autho­
rity in all quasi-judicial cases and reviews the Board's 
Agenda.
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Planning and Policy Staff - Formulates, recommends 
and continually evaluates and analyzes the broad policies 
and guidelines, plans and programs of MARINA for the 
promotion and development of the maritime industry in 
coordination with the appropriate units, concerned govern­
ment agencies and the private sector; reviews, evaluates, 
coordinates and monitors projects developed and undertaken 
by the various units of the Authority.
Management Services Staff - Formulates, develops and 
maintains information systems to support the promotion, 
development, regulation and supervision activities of the 
Authority and monitoring systems in the implementation of 
plans, programs, policies and guidelines; reviev/s and 
improves, if necessary, existing management systems and 
procedures to achieve maximum efficiency in the Authori­
ty's operations.
Administrative and Finance Office - Plans, directs 
and supervises the general management and support service 
for all MARINA units; and formulates, develops and imple­
ments administrative programs and activities related to 
budgetary and accounting services, human resource develop­
ment and office administration.
Regional Offices - Implements MARINA programs in the 
Region; performs deleg_a,ted functions with respect to 
issuance of Provisional Authority (PA) to uncontested 
original applications for CPC and issuance of Special 
Permits (SP) under Sec.12 CD) of PD 474. The six regional 
offices are located in the cities of Cebu, Zamboanga, 
Iloilo, Cagayan de Oro, Batangas and Davao.
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2. Scope and Coverage.
The regulatory and developmental functions of MARINA 
encompass the broadest concept of the maritime industry, 
that is, the subjects of such exercises are those enter­
prises engaged in the business of designing, constructing, 
manufacturing, acquiring, operating, supplying, repairing 
and/or maintaining vessels. These include persons operat­
ing and/or managing shipping lines, stevedoring, arrastre 
and customs brokerage services, shipyards, drydocks, ma­
rine railways, marine repair shops, freight forv;arding and 
the like.
As regards vessels or watercrafts, specific condi­
tions must be met in order to fall within the purview of 
MARINA. Such crafts must be motorized and weigh over three 
gross tons and are classified as barges, lighter, bulk 
carrier, passenger ship, freighter, tanker, etc.
MARINA'S coverage is limited to purely commercial 
maritime operations. It follov;s that other ventures 
although marine-related are exempted from MARINA regula­
tions, e.g. the vessels and enterprises owned and opera­
ted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and by foreign 
governments for purely military and strategic purposes, 
such as defense and deterrence; pleasure craft, yachts 
and sailboats; and fishing vessels which are non-motorized 
and below three gross tons.
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3. Jurisdiction.
Section 4 of Presidential Decree 474 specifically 
provides that MARINA shall have general jurisdiction and 
control over all persons, corporations, firms and entities 
in the maritime industry of the Philippines, the derived 
benefits of which accrue to Filipino nationals or, in the 
case of corporations, to the majority of Filipino stock­
holders. Sole proprietors of maritime enterprises must 
be Filipino citizens; sixty percent of the outstanding 
capital stock of corporations with vote entitlements must 
be owned by Filipino nationals; or, in the case of joint 
ventures, at least sixty percent of the members of the 
governing board of both corporations must be Filipino 
nationals.
4. Activities.
The main basis for the regul at ion and control of
ships engaged in the Phi1ippine commer cial trade is the
issuance by MARINA of the certificate of public conven­
ience (CPC). In effect, the CPC constitutes the license 
for the vessel to finally sail at sea. It is the permit 
to conduct commercial carriage of goods, raw materials, 
products, and people. The CPC is granted on the feasibi­
lity and validity of statutory documents presented by the 
shipowner.
The CPC extends legal rights to the shipowner to 
field his vessei(s> on the specific routes applied for. 
It contains the conditions within which a vessel carries
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on the passenger and cargo trade. Specific time sche­
dules, departure and arrivals, passenger and cargo rates 
are spelled out. The validity of the certificate, usually 
in multiples of two, five, ten, and fifteen years, depends 
upon the make, age and general condition of the ship. The 
obligation of the shipowner lies in the provision of 
amenities on board for safety, comfort and well-being of 
passengers and cargoes. Reports to MARINA consist of the 
submission of annual financial records, together with the 
payments of supervision fees.
On the other hand, in the Philippine context, the 
Certificate of Philippine Registry (CPR) issued by the 
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), which will be discussed 
later under a different heading, is merely to satisfy 
that obligation as to grant of nationality and flag to 
a vessel and provide proof of the link between the state 
and the ship. It is not by itself a permit to travel.
^ The other activities v/ithin the competence of MARINA
are pertinently provided for in Executive Order 125, as 
f ollows:
-Assistance to various officers, professionals, 
technicians, skilled workers, and seamen such 
that they are gainfully employed in the domestic 
shipping, shipbuilding/ship repair enterprise;
-Promotion of working conditions and terms of 
employment of officers and crew of Philippine 
Registered Vessels, including those employed on
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land-based marine ventures;
-Investigation by itself or with other government 
agencies of all matters within its jurisdiction, 
except marine casualties or accidents which 
shall be undertaken by the Philippine Coast 
Guard.
-Approve the sale, lease, or transfer the manage­
ment of vessels owned by Philippine nationals to 
foreign ovmed or controlled enterprises;
-Prescribe and enforce rules and regulations for 
the prevention of marine pollution in Philippine 
waters in coordination with the government au­
thorities concerned;
-Recommend/approve of such measures necessary for 
the regulation of the importation and exporta­
tion of vessels, their equipment and spare parts;
-Inspection and evaluation of training standards, 
facilities and performance of maritime educatio­
nal programs of state and private schools; and
-Conduct of pre-employment, on-the-job or upgrad­
ing of professional skills for seamen and on 
shore support facilities to the maritime indust­
ries.
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Marine casualty investigation as an inherent function 
of MARINA was vested upon it on 20 March 1985 when the 
President of the Philippines signed Executive Order 1011, 
which transferred the quasi-judicial functions of the 
defunct Board of Transportation pertaining to water 
transportation to MARINA. The executive proclamation 
empowered MARINA through its Board of Directors or any 
person(s) duly authorized by the board to perform the 
following functions:
-to identify, establish, prescribe, and regulate 
routes, sailing schedules and frequencies, types 
of service, economically viable capacities, and 
zones or areas of operation of public v/ater 
transportation services, such as those provided 
by commercial vessels engaged in interisland li­
ner shipping. This is provisional upon the 
establishment of routes and areas of operation 
in accordance with, the domestic public water 
transportation development plans and programs, 
approved by the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communications;
-to issue, amend, revise, suspend or cancel 
Certificates of Public Convenience or permits, 
authorizing the operation of public water trans­
portation services, including the prescription 
of appropriate terms and conditions. This is 
on condition that in the case of tramping or non­
liner operations, the powers and functions enu­
merated in the preceding and succeeding para-
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graphs shall not apply;
-to determine, fix and approve, periodically re­
view and adjust, reasonable passenger fares, 
freight rates and other related charges, rela­
tive to the operation of domestic public water 
transportation services engaged in liner ship­
ping;
-to issue preliminary or permanent injunctions, 
whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases 
in which it has jurisdiction, and in which cases 
the pertinent provisions of the rules of Court 
shall apply;
-to punish for contempt of the Authority, both 
directly and indirectly, in accordance with the 
pertinent provisions of, and the penalties pres­
cribed by the Rules of Court;
-to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and 
to summon witnesses to appear in any proceed­
ings of the Authority to administer oaths and 
affirmations, and in appropriate cases, to order 
the search and seizure of all vessels and docu­
ments. as may be necessary for the proper dispo­
sition of the cases before it; and
-to impose fines and or/penalties for violation 
of this order, or any other laws, rules and 
regulations being implemented by the Authority,
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or its orders, decisions and/or rulings.
It is apparent that the subject of investigation is 
the certificate of public convenience (CPC) issued by 
MARINA and the violations of the provisions thereof. The 
bases of the investigation are complaints from aggrieved 
parties or at the instance of MARINA itself which acts as 
complainant in the following cases:
-Overcharging or undercutting of tariff rates for 
unfair economic gain or advantage over competi­
tor s ;
-Digression from approved trade routes;
-Non-observance of authorized passenger/cargo ca- 
capacity resulting in overloading and/or over- 
crov/ding of the vessel;
-Unjustified violations of time schedules for 
departures and arrivals;
-Violations of the economic regulations as re­
gards ownership, capitalization, citizenship of 
owners, non-payment of statutory fees, etc;
-Absence of necessary equipment for safe naviga­
tion, emergency procedures and life saving para­
phernalia in cases of accidents;
-Absence or lack of valid certificates for ships'
38
of ficers ; and
-Conditions relating to the unseaworthiness of 
the vessel.
It is, therefore, only when there are apparent 
grounds indicative of CPC violations that MARINA intei— 
venes and initiates action against responsible persons in 
a marine casualty investigation.
As an additional input, it is Worthv/hile mention­
ing that President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive 
Orders 125 and 125-A on 30 January 1987 and 13 April 1987, 
respectively. The main provisions of these laws consist 
in the transfer of additional functions from the PCG to 
MARINA and are listed as follov/s:
-to register vessels as well as issue certificates, 





the safety regulatory functions per- 
vessel construction and operation 
determination of manning levels;
-to enforce laws, prescribe and implement rules and 
regulations, including penalties for violations 
thereof, governing water transportation and the 
Philippine merchant marine, with the aid of other 
law enforcement agencies;
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-to undertake the issuance of licenses to qualified 
seamen and harbor, bay and river pilots; and
-to issue and register the continuous discharge book 
of Filipino seamen.
The above functions were inherent to the Philippine Coast 
Guard which before the issuance of the cited directives 
was discharging the legitimate role of the maritime safety 
administration and, equally up to this time. MARINA has 
been involved more on the commercial aspects of the ship­
ping cycle.
In the pursuit of these directives and in viev/ of the 
expanded responsibilities transferred to MARINA, this 
agency undertook a major re-organization in terms of nev; 
offices, divisions, additional personnel and, of course, a 
higher budget in order to enable itself to address the new 
tasks.
The complete re-organization of MARINA was effected 
in 1988 and 1989 but unfortunately the proposed budget v;as 
never approved. During these times, drastic cuts in 
government expenditures were strictly enforced due to 
double-digit-inflation, an irrational balance of payments 
and the national obligation of foreign debt servicing. 
Here was a situation where MARINA had evolved a maritime 
safety administration infrastructure but, with .such few 
resources to prop up the new commitments.
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Questions as to whether MARINA had enough technical 
expertise to confidently assume the newly created activi­
ties also came into the picture. There were also doubts 
on the capability of the agency to provide a comprehensive 
interisland network (vis-a-vis that of the PCG) to monitor 
shipping operations, conduct periodic inspections/surveys 
and apprehend violators.
It is perhaps for these collective reasons that the 
MARINA Administrator has decided to defer the assumption 
of the nev/ mandated functions until such time that it can 
considerably and confidently accept and discharge them. 
Of course, the larger part of the private shipping sector 
has decried such a move. For quite a long period, they 
have lobbied for the consolidation of maritime regulations 
and transactions under one agency for obvious reasons. 
Foremost among these v;as the immense bureaucratic red tape 
involved. Two or even more agencies responsible for a 
single line of enterprise will no doubt produce overlaps, 
multiplicity of documents, diversity of concentration and 
service philosophies which will certainly occur when the 
right hand has no idea what the left hand is doing.
Since the issue on the validity of the accusations 
are still debatable or unresolved, and the agencies 
concerned continue to each, discharge their respective 
functions prior to Executive Orders 125 and 125-A, this 
writer will dwell on the status quo, i.e. limiting consi­
deration to the premise that MARINA is the Maritime 
Administration and the PCG is the Maritime Safety Adminis­
tration.
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5. Procedure of Investigation.
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All complaints are substantiated by an official re­
port of a MARINA inspector/surveyor. The Legal Department 
of MARINA is the appropriate unit that accepts and files 
the official complaint. A complaint is deemed sufficient 
if it contains the name of the complainant or the offended 
party, the name of the respondent, a reference to the , 
provisions violated whenever practicable, the acts or 
omissions complained of as constituting the offense, and 
the date, hour and place of the commission of the offense.*
When the Legal Department has satisfied itself as to 
the sufficiency of the complaint, especially when the ins­
pectors/surveyors have given substance to the complaint 
through corroboration or confirmation, a summons is for­
warded to the respondent together with a copy of the 
complaint, ordering the latter to answer v;ithin five days 
from receipt thereof and to appear and produce evidence on 
the date and hour specified in the notice.
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However, in cases where the operator/shipowner is the 
subject of the complaint and is reported to have caused or 
may continue to cause death, physical injuries, defrauda­
tion of public utility users or other serious harm to 
public interest, a more urgent or shorter proceeding is 
resorted to. The alternative course in these cases is 
then called summary proceedings in which MARINA orders 
the respondent to appear before the Hearing Officer 
within seventy-tv70 hours from his receipt of the Order and 
show cause why his CPC should not be cancelled or suspend­
ed for reasons stated in the complaint or surveyor's/ 
inspector's report.
When the subject of the complaint appears before the 
duly authorized Hearing Officer, he may do so in person or 
through an attorney/counse1 of his choice provided such 
attorney/counsel has first served a written notice of 
appearance on behalf of the respondent.
Further activities after this condition are those 
normally followed in regular courts such as the presenta­
tion of evidence, examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses, etc., all leading to an order, ruling, decision 
or resolution of the case to be promulgated by the Hearing 
Officer or the Board of Directors sitting en banc.
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Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)
The Philippine Coast Guard, which was established by 
Republic Act 5173, is a military entity under the direct 
operational control of the Philippine Navy, a branch of. 
the Armed Forces, Department of National Defense. It 
stands as the de facto Maritime Safety Administration in 
the Philippines.
The enabling act of the PCG Charter specifies that 
its main functions are "to enforce all applicable laws, 
promulgate and administer regulations in order to promote 
the safety of life and property at sea and to enhance the 
naval defense of the country."
1. Organizational Structure.
The PCG is headed by the Commandant who is assisted 
by the Deputy Commandant and a Chief of Staff.
The divisions under their supervision which exercise 
maritime safety administration functions are as follows:
CG 8 - assists the Commandant in the formulation of 
policies, rules and guidelines for the documentation, 
registration, inspection, and operation of merchant ves­
sels for the promotion of safety of life and property at 
sea.
CG 9 - assists the Commandant in promoting marine 
environmental protection through pollution control and
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abatement and the enforcement of the state fishery laws.
CG 10 - is responsible for the operation, maintenance 
and improvement of navigational aids, thereby enhancing 
the safety of navigation in Philippine waters.
CG 11 - is in-charge of the administration and regu­
lation of merchant marine personnel as regards training, 
registration atnd the conduct of emergency readiness 
drills.
Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) - conducts formal in­
vestigation into the cause(s) of marine accidents in order 
to prevent similar occurrences in the future.
Seaman's Registration and Processing Unit (SPRU) - is 
responsible for the registration of seamen, monitoring of 
their on-board-conduct through their control over the 
Seaman's Continuous Discharge Book.
District Offices - are eight field offices acting as 
extensions of central PCG Command. (Illustration 2)
2. Scope and Coverage.
The subjects of PCG activities include all motorized, 
waterborne crafts engaged in commercial ventures. In 
contrast to MARINA, the PCG is responsible as well for the 
registration of fishing vessels, whether artisanal or for 
subsistence use, and also pleasure yachts and other 
private motorized crafts. This activity emerges more from
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the military (and defense) orientation of PCG in,relation 
to the combat of smuggling, piracy and illegal fishing 
operations.
Significantly, the PCG has existing memoranda of 
understanding with other government agencies. By reason 
of its widespread network and availability of waterborne 
craft, the PCG has become the marine enforcement arm of 
agencies such as:
MARINA - for ensuring that the conditions of the 
certificates of public convenience are observed, i.e. as 
to vessel routes, fares, arrivals and departures, passen­
ger safety and convenience.
Bureau of Customs - for the apprehension of smugglers 
and seizure of smuggled goods and curtailment of other 
illegal activities particularly meant to defraud the 
government of tax duties.
Bureau of Fisheries - for the control and prevention 
of illegal fishing activities.
Professional Regulations Commission - for the assur­
ance that only duly licensed marine officers and certifi­
cated crew serve on board merchant marine vessels.
Commission on Immigration and Deportation - for the 
monitoring and apprehension of vessels engaged in the 
carriage of illegal aliens.
Philippine Ports Authority - for cooperation in their
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objectives in line with port security and vessel traffic.
Bureau of Plant and Animal Industry - for the control 
and apprehension of undocumented plant, timber and all 
livestock transfers.
Central Bank of the Philippines - for the prevention 
of illegal transport of foreign exchange through seaborne 
crafts.
Postal Service Office - for the security of mail 
transport on waterborne crafts.
National Telecommunications Commission - for the con­
trol and supervision of maritime communications and 
equipment including frequency allocations.
3. Jurisdiction.
The Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations 
have defined the respective jurisdiction of each class of 
investigation body (the classes of which body shall be 
discussed in number 4 hereunder) by pertinently providing, 
as follows:
The Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI). - Shall have the 
jurisdiction to investigate marine accidents or casualties 
relative to the liability of shipov/ners and officers; 
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate cases/complaints 
against the marine officers; and, to review all proceed­
ings or investigations conducted by the Special Boards of
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Marine Inquiry.
The Special Board of Marine Inquiry. - Shall have 
original jurisdiction to investigate marine casualties and 
disasters which occur or are committed within the limits 
of the Coast Guard District concerned or those referred to 
by the Commandant.
The Hearing Officers. - Shall have jurisdiction to 
investigate violations of existing maritime lav/s and/or
t
regulations committed within the limits of his Coast 
Guard District v/hich the Philippine Coast Guard is 
empowered to enforce and for v;hich the imposition of 
administrative fines are * provided; cases or complaints 
against holders of seamen's certificates not otherv/ise 
licensed as marine officers shall also be cognizable by 
the Hearing Officers and may ^ be filed before the Hearing 
Officer of the Coast Guard District where the respondent 
resides or where the complainant resides at the election 
of the complainant.
4. Activities.
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As regards vessel safety, the PCG approves plans for 
the construction, repair or alteration of vessels. In its 
task of issuing certificates of registry for purposes of
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establishing vessel ownership, flag, identity, ship-hull 
integrity, the PCG on its own conducts inspection and 
survey of vessels. The end result of such surveys is the 
issuance of documents/certificates required nationally or 
internationally.
Navigational and safety aids are also within the 
purview of the PCG competence; hence, it enforces rules 
for vessel lights, signals, steering, sailing, passing, 
anchorage, towlines, bridge signals, etc, and near or on 
shore facilities such as harbour lights, lighthouses and 
buoys. Wrecks, floating or sunken, a danger to navigation 
are destroyed or towed in port. Fish traps that pose a 
threat to the sea lanes are dismantled. Permits for 
salvage and salvage operations are supervised by the PCG. 
Search and rescue operations are also instituted on the 
high seas and i-n waters subject to Philippine jurisdic­
tion.
Pollution from ship discharge and sewage from coast- 
v;ise industrial concerns are monitored and fines and 
penalties are imposed on violators.
In the development of maritime personnel, the PCG has 
the task of the supervision of maritime schools and train­
ing centers, in coordination with the Department of 
Education, Culture and Sports, as regards courses in 
navigation, seamanship and marine engineering programs. A 
seaman's training center is being administered by CG 11 
for the training and upgrading of seamen's skills in fire­
fighting, survival craft handling, first aid and radar
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observation.
The manning levels of domestic and international flag 
carriers are also supervised by the PCG. In this context, 
crew nationalities are verified, emergency preparedness 
drills conducted and vessel safety equipment (lifeboats, 
rafts, jackets and their location and markings) inspected.
Examinations are conducted to qualify harbour pilots, 
major and minor patrons and other unlicensed merchant 
marine personnel for coastwise travel.
For national security purposes 
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Relative to the liability of shipowners and ship 
officers, the PCG enforces the rules on their ponduct in 
the occurrence of accidents which are investigated to 
ascertain the cause(s), establish liability and report to 
the proper authorities for appropriate action.
The Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) of the PCG is the 
body designated by the Commandant which has jurisdiction 
to investigate marine casualties relative to the liability 
of shipowners and officers. It exercises exclusive juris­
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diction over cases/complaints against marine officers.
There are three (3) classifications of Coast Guard 
Hearing Bodies:
The Board of Marine Inquiry <BMI) - is composed of 
five members appointed by the Secretary of National 
Defense upon recommendation of the Commandant. It is 
constituted by one PCG line officer of Captain's rank as 
Chairman. The members are two master mariners and one 
chief engineer of the Philippine merchant marine and one 
member of the Philippine Bar.
The Special Board of Marine Inquiry (SBMI) - is crea­
ted by the Commandant in areas covered by a Coast Guard 
District depending on the exigencies demanded by public 
interests as well as on the degree and extent of the 
incident/accident. It is composed of one PCG line officer 
as Chairman, one licensed master and one licensed chief 
engineer as members chosen from among qualified civilians 
or PCG personnel.
The Hearing Officer - is designated by the Commandant 
from among military officers and/or civilian employees of 
the Coast Guard, preferably the legal officer of the 
District or civilian Coast Guard lawyer.
The powers of the BMI, SBMI and Hearing Officer 
consist of the following:
- to go on board a ship and inspect the same or any
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part thereof or any of the machinery, boats, equipment or 
articles not necessarily detaining or delaying her from 
proceeding on any voyage;
- to enter and inspect any premises for the sole 
purpose of creating a report thereof;
- to summon witnesses having knowledge on the subject 
matter to appear in the hearing and ansv/er questions;
- to require and enforce the production of all books, 
papers or documents or any other evidence considered 
important for the purpose; and
- to administer oaths or, in lieu thereof, require 
any person to make and subscribe a declaration of the 
truth of his own statement<s).
5. Procedures of Investigation.
4.1 Any investigation may be initiated:
- by the Commandant at his own instance;
- through the sworn complaint of any person, if after 
the preliminary inquiry, a prima-facie case has been 
established;
- through the filing of an inspection/apprehension 
report by any unit of the Philippine Navy or the PCG; or
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- at the instance of a marine protest.
4.2 In all investigations, the party-litigants are 
given the opportunity to present their case or defend 
themselves personally or through counsel, and to present, 
all witnesses and evidence as they may desire. The inves­
tigating body, however, has the discretion to overrule 
unreasonable motions regarding presentations of evidence 
which are deemed irrelevant or dilatory.
4.3 Party-litigants and witnesses are issued/notified 
by a subpoena of the scheduled hearing within at least 
five days of the hearing. The notice specifies the day, 
date, time and place of the hearing.
4.4 The order of the hearing is as follov;s:
- the complainant or the PCG itself is first to intro­
duce the evidence;
- the respondent or adverse party shall then present 
evidence in support of his defense; and
- when the presentation of evidence is concluded and 
the formal offer thereof has been made, the parties may be 
required to submit their respective memoranda within a 
reasonable time.
4.5 The order in which a witness may be examined is 
as follows:
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- direct examination by the proponent,
- cross examination by the opponent,
- re-direct examination by the proponent,
- re-cross examination by the opponent.
4.6 Objections or interlocutory questions are recog­
nized and resolved by the Chairman of the Board or Hearing 
Officer.
4.7 The proceedings are not bound by the strict rules 
of evidence but such rules of the court are follov/ed by 
analogy for practicality and convenience.
4.8 The use of stenographers is optional except when 
the Chairman of the Board or Hearing Officer deems that 
the nature of the caserequi res the availability of one.
4.9 All documentary evidence and exhibits are marked 
by letters A, B, C, etc when introduced by the complainant 
and by numbers 1, 2, 3, etc when presented by the 
respondent.
4.10 If the complainant fails to appear at the time 
of the trial or fails to prosecute his case for a reasona­
ble length of time, the action may be dismissed by 
either a motion of the defendant or the Chairman himself.
4.11 If the respondent fails or refuses to appear
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serviceby himself or through 
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counsel after proof of 
he shall be declared in default.
4.12 If one party is declared in default or refuses 
to recognize the authority of the investigating body, such 
body may proceed with the hearing ex parte.
4.13 The order of default may be set aside on motion 
of that party by showing that his failure was due to 
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and that 
he has a meritorious defense. The motion must be executed 
before a decision on the case is arrived at.
After due hearing, the records of the proceedings, 
findings and recommendations of the. Board or Hearing 
Officer are submitted to the Commandant for approval. 
The decision of the Commandant may or may not be based 
on the findings/ recommendations of the Board. His deci­
sion may take the form of reprimands to erring officers, 
suspension or revocation of marine certificates and/or 
declaring an administrative liability on the part of the 
shipowner/operator. Another alternative is his ordering 
a further investigation of the case.
Thus far, the author has discussed the quasi­
judicial procedures resorted to in cases of marine 
accidents/incidents. There are cases, however, when 
the Commandant recommends the handling of such cases by 
the proper civil courts or when the government itself 
steps in and orders a formal investigation.
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The Commandant recommends a public settlement/ 
inquiry under the following conditions:
- when the casualty was accompanied by loss of life 
or property or involved in serious damage.
- if the casualty has given rise to.a substantial 
amount of public attention or to a disturbance 
of public confidence.
- if it appears that national legislation must 
be applied to lessen or minimize the impact 
of such casualties.
Under the above conditions, the PCG relegates itself 
to the role of assisting the court in every possible 
manner and may include:
- recommending to Che service of a competent coun­
sel to represent the government,
- recommending the composition of a panel of as­
sessors ,
- producing the proceedings of the preliminary 
inquiry,
- arranging for the production and attendance of 
wi tnesses
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2. Although MARINA and PCG act whenever a sea accident 
occurs, neither of the two offices does the investigation 
for that stated purpose. While MARINA determines whether 
violations of the CPC provisions have been committed, the 
PCG determines the liabilities of shipowners and officers. 
Investigations by both are purely adversary-in-nature.
3. There is actually overlapping or duplication of 
functions betv?een MARINA and PCG which receives much 
public objection and criticism.
4. The executive proclamations defining the investigative 
powers of MARINA and PCG are quite unclear. Diverging 
interpretations thereon add to the complications in the 
furtherance of the marine casualty investigation system.
5. MARINA and PCG are equally regulatory and enforcement 
offices in maritime affairs - thus, th^y have 'conflicts 
of interest' potentialities as investigators of sea inci­
dents .
6. The MARINA and PCG investigations contain no safety 
recommendations from which appropriate standards could be 
derived.
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8. Only formal investigations on marine cases are under­
taken because of the absence of express provisions, by 
law or otherwise, on the conduct of preliminary inquiries. 
Consequently, these investigations last so long.
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Chapter III
ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN and CANADIAN SYSTEMS 
FOR MARINE CASUALTY INVESTIGATION
This chapter will present the salient features of 
the marine casualty investigation systems in the United 
States and Canada and discuss hov^ these can practically 
influence and set an ideal basis for the formation of a 
more vital framework in the Philippine system, as one is 
admittedly wanted.
The American System
The United States of America has a dual system of ma­
rine casualty investigation; one is that being carried out 
by the United States Coast Guard; and the other, by the 
National Transport Safety Board.
United States Coast Guard (USCG).
1. General Overview. The USCG, which is under the 
control and supervision of the Department of Transporta­
tion, carries out maritime responsibilities ranging from 
vessel inspection and certification, licensing and certi­
fication of personnel, federal pilotage, vessel traffic 
management, regulations, and enforcement, for marine cas­
ualty investigation. Under the set up, the possibility of
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conflict of interest is evidently strong because, with the 
USCG investigators being part of the inspection service 
and all Coast Guard activities being answerable to only 
one authority, the USCG acts as regulator, enforcer, and 
judge as well. In addition, in the investigation of marine 
accidents where Coast Guard vessels were involved (princi­
pally the USCG Cutter Blackthorn- SS Capricorn collision), 
the USCG was said to be investigating itself, even though 
the conduct of investigation was participated in by the 
NTSB. Hence, a Joint Memorandum of Understanding which 
shall be discussed below was correspondingly entered into 
by and between the USCG and NTSB, giving the latter the 
sole power to investigate accidents involving the CG 
vessels.
The Commandant who is in full charge of the USCG ren­
ders the decisions on major marine casualty investiga­
tions then carried on by senior investigating officers and 
investigators of field offices distributed among 11 dis­
tricts. The District Marine Safety Offices, headed by 
District Commanders, have complete control over the inves­
tigative operations. (illustration 3)
The pertinent CG legislation is found in 46 United 
States Code and its implementing 46 Code of Federal Regu­
lations.
2. Authority and Jurisdiction. The USCG is empower­
ed to investigate marine incidents so identified under 
Chapter 61, Title 46, United States Code, which are those 
resulting in death, serious injury, material property
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loss, or material damage affecting a vessel's seaworthi 
ness. It has jurisdiction over:
(2.1) a marine casualty or other accident involv­
ing any vessel upon the navigable waters of the 
United States, or involving US vessels wherever 
they may be;
(2.2) an accident involving 
or damage to, any bridge or 
the navigable waters of the 
land structure or shore area 
to those waters;
the destruction of, 
other structure.or in 
United States, or any 
immediately adjacent
(2.3) an incident involving a major fire, an oil 
spill, or any injury occurring as a result of 
operations conducted pursuant to the Outer Conti­
nental Shelf Lands Act, as amended (OCSLA) includ­
ing allegations of. unsafe v/orking conditions or 
violations of safety regulations;
(2.4) water pollution by oil or other hazardous 
substances or the threat thereof to the "waters of 
the United States” (anywhere in the hydrologic 
chair);
(2.5) acts of misconduct, incompetence; negli­
gence, unskillfulness, or willful violation of law 
committed by any licensed, certificated, or docu­
mented individuals;
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(2.6) boating accidents; and
(2.7) casualties or accidents which occur to any 
component of a deepwater port.
3. Purpose. Guided by Chapter 3 of its Marine Safe­
ty Manual, implementing Parts 4 & 5 of 46 Code of Federal 
Regulations, the USCG investigates marine casualties "to 
obtain factual information for the prevention of similar 
casualties, as far as practicable - which information will 
be available for program reviev? and statistical studies, 
and for adoption of appropriate corrective measures, 
standards of safety, and legislation and regulations; and 
to determine whether there is any evidence of violation 
of law or regulation warranting institution of civil 
penalty action under any of the laws administered by the 
Coast Guard, or suspension or revocation proceedings under 
46 United States Code 7703". Ergo, the USCG investiga­
tions do not only take into account the safety aspects but 
also the disciplinary and penalty aspects.
4. Investigation Procedure. The USCG requires the 
reporting of accidents on CG Form 2692 wherein the vessel 
owner/operator has to indicate data needed for documenta­
tion of the case, such as identity of vessel, personnel, 
etc, as well as, a description of what occurred and the 
best guess as to why/how it occurred. It is the job of the 
investigating officer to review such forms when they are 
sent in, to determine if the information provided is com­
plete and accurate, to conduct preliminary interviews as 
necessary, arid then to evaluate whether or not more de­
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tailed investigation is necessary. If CG Form 2692 is 
found to be sufficient, the investigating officer merely 
endorses it to higher officials to indicate apparent cause 
of casualty; otherwise, the investigating officer may use 
a letter of transmittal to go with the form, or may write 
a full narrative report which includes findings of fact, 
conclusions, and recommendations. However, investigations 
of more complex cases are conducted in a formal setting 
(usually by either a one-man-board of inquiry or Marine 
Board of Investigation), with sworn testimonies taken in a 
public hearing and transcribed by a court reporter, parti­
cipation by interested parties, etc. Decisions are ren­
dered at the level of the District Commander or the Head­
quarters (particularly the Commandant), as the case may 
be, on the basis of the recommendations of the investiga­
ting officers.
National Transport Safety Board (NTSB)
f
1. General Overview. The NTSB was originally formed 
in 1966 as a result of 'conflict of interest' concerns. 
From 1967 to 1974, it v/as placed under the structure of 
the Department of Transportation. In the latter year, the 
NTSB became a totally independent agency of the United 
States by virtue of the Independent Safety Board Act of 
1974. The rationale behind the Act was to enable the NTSB 
to freely criticize the activities of the other agencies 
of the Department of Transportation, the legislative body 
concluding that "if the Board is under pressure from any 
administration to pull its punch or to tone down its 



















tion safety, then its watchdog function has been fatally 
compromised."
The Organization is composed of five members who are 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of 
the Senate. One of the members is designated as Chairman 
by the President with the advice of the Senate, and one 
as Vice Chairman. Forming the Board's permanent or 
regular staff are nine principal offices/bureaus; one of 
which is the Bureau of Accident Investigation where its 
Marine Division is responsible for the investigation of 
accidents at sea. (Illustration 4)
The NTSB legislation is found in the Independent 
Safety Board Act of 1974, as embodied in 49 United States 
Code and its implementing 49 Code of Federal Regulations, 
the Sunshine Act,and Freedom of Information Act.
2. Authority and Jurisdiction. Under the Indepen­
dent Safety Board Act of 1974, as amended (49 United 
States Code 1901 et seq.), the NTSB is empowered to inves­
tigate accidents in all modes of transport, i e air, sea, 
rail, road, and pipelines. It may investigate (or cause 
to be investigated) major marine casualties involving 
public/non-public vessels, and any other accident which 
occurs in connection with the transportation of people or 
property which, in the judgment of the Board, is catastro­
phic, involves problems of a recurring character, or would 
carry out the policy of the Act. It has:
(2.1) original jurisdiction over major marine ca-
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sualties, except one involving only public vessels, 
occurring on the navigable waters or territorial 
seas of the United States, or involving a vessel of 
the United States, in accordance with the regula­
tions prescribed by the Board and the Secretary 
of the Department of Transportation (jointly);
(2.2) concurrent jurisdiction with the USCG over 
marine accidents involving a public vessel and any 
other vessel; and
(2.3) appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of 
the Commandant of the Coast Guard revoking, suspen­
ding or denying a license, certificate, document, 
or register.
3. Purpose. NTSB investigation is a safety-related 
and not a fault-finding one. It encourages material wit­
nesses at the incident to openly and freely give the true 
facts about v/hat really went wrong, without any fear of 
being prosecuted or penalized later, on the basis of the 
outcome of the investigation. From this factual informa­
tion. solutions to safety problems are derived.
4. Investigation Procedure. In as much as there is 
no compulsory legal requirement for casualty reporting to 
the Board, the USCG, where ail reports are made, has' the 
duty to advise the NTSB of the "major marine casualties” 
falling within the latter's jurisdiction. Once advised, 
the NTSB has then the option to investigate the case 
either independently or jointly with the USCG.
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First Option - The NTSB independently conducts 
.field investigations carried out by a team of men 
coming from various technical-staff-groups, with 
the investigating officer of the Marine Division 
acting as the Head. Evidence is gathered infor­
mally, usually by taking down notes. In some 
sensitive cases, however, public hearings or de­
position proceedings are held.
Second Option-- The NTSB requests the USCG to 
conduct the investigation, at times with a NTSB 
representative (who may sit in and makes recom­
mendations about the scope of investigation, 
calls and examines witnesses, and submits on re­
quest additional evidence). After completion of 
the investigation, the USCG Commandant forwards 
the records of proceedings to the NTSB which 
makes its own report/recommendations addressed to 
parties-in-interest and/or other government of­
fices.
Joint Memorandum of Understanding (USCG and NTSB).
The Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, as amended, 
provided that NTSB investigations had priority over all 
federal investigations respecting every mode of transport. 
Nonetheless, it specifically restricted the Board's juris­
diction respecting marine casualties to "major marine 
casualties", without in any way diminishing the responsi­
bilities of the USCG which had jurisdiction over investi­
gation of all accidents. Thus, both NTSB and USCG had the
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power to investigate major marine casualties; which arran­
gement did not only gain dissatisfaction on the part of 
the said offices but also was criticized in certain cases. 
In the USCG Cutter Blackthorn - SS Capricorn collision 
(Trampa Bay, 1980), where the NTSB participated in the 
USCG investigation albeit submitted a separate report, the 
public claimed.that the USCG was investigating itself.
Consequently, a Joint Memorandum of Understanding was 
entered into by and between the NTSB and USCG in 1981, in­
ter alia defining the investigative powers of each office 
in such a way that duplication of efforts could be avoid­
ed. The agreed CG/NTSB regulations governing the conduct 
of investigations are now contained in 46 CFR 4.40 and 49 
CFR 850. And these are, as follows:
1. Preliminary Investigation by the Coast Guard -
(1.1) The Coast Guard conducts the preliminary 
investigation of marine casualties.
(1.2) The Commandant determines from the prelimina­
ry investigation whether:
(1.2.1) The casualty is a major marine cas­
ualty; or
(1.2.2) The casualty involves a public and 
a nonpublic vessel and at least one fatality 
or $75,000 in property damage; or
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(1.2.3) The casualty involves a Coast Guard 
and a nonpublic vessel and at least one fata­
lity or $75,000 in property damage; or
(1.2.4) The casualty is a major marine cas­
ualty which involves significant safety is­
sues relating to Coast Guard safety functions 
e.g., search and rescue, aids to navigation, 
vessel traffic systems, commercial vessel 
safety, etc.
(1.3) The Commandant notifies the Board of a casual­
ty as described in paragraph 1.2.
2. Marine Casualty Investigation by the Board -
(2.1) The Board may conduct an investigation under 
the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 of any major 
marine casualty or any casualty involving public and 
nonpublic vessels. Where the Board determines it 
will convene a hearing in connection with such an in­
vestigation, the Board's rule of practice for trans­
portation accident hearings in 49 CFR Part 845 
shall apply.
(2.2) The Board shall conduct an investigation under 
the Act when:
(2.2.1) The casualty involves a Coast Guard 
and a nonpublic vessel and at least one fatali­
ty or $75,000 in property damage; or
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(2.2.2) The Commandant and the Board agree that 
the Board shall conduct the investigation, and 
the casualty involves a public and nonpublic 
vessel and at least one fatality or $75,000 in 
property damage; or
(2.2.3) The Commandant and the Board agree 
that the Board shall conduct the investigation, 
and the casualty is a major marine casualty 
which involves significant safety issues relat­
ing to Coast Guard safety functions.
3. Cause or Probable Cause Determinations from Board 
Investigations -
After an investigation conducted by the Board 
under the above-paragraph (2), the Board determines 
cause or probable cause and issues a report of that 
determination. i.
4. Coast Guard Marine Casualty Investigation for the 
Board -
(4.1) If the Board does not conduct an investigation 
under the above-paragraphs (2.1), (2.2.2) or (2.2.3), 
the Coast Guard, at the request of the Board, may 
conduct an investigation under the Act unless there 
is an allegation of Federal Government misfeasance 
or nonfeasance.
(4.2) The Board will request the Coast Guard to con­
duct an investigation under the preceding paragraph
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within 48 hours of receiving notice of a casualty.
(4.3) The Coast Guard will advise the Board within 
24 hours of receipt of a request for CG investigation 
whether it will conduct an investigation under the 
Act.
5. Procedures for Coast Guard Investigation ~
(5.1) The Coast Guard conducts an investigation un­
der the above-paragraph 4 using the procedures in 46 
CFR 4.01-1 through 4.23-1.
(5.2) The Board may designate a person or persons to 
participate in every phase of an investigation, in­
cluding onscene investigation, that is conducted 
under the above-paragraph 4.
(5.3) Consistent with Coast Guard responsibility to 
direct the course of the investigation, the person or 
persons designated by the Board under the preceding 
paragraph may:
(5.3.1) Make recommendations about the scope 
of the investigation.
(5.3.2) Call and examine witnesses.
(5.3.3) Subitiit or request additional evidence.
(5.4) The Commandant provides a record of the pro-
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ceedings to the Board of an investigation of a major 
marine casualty under the above-paragraph (5.1).
(5.5) The Board, under the Act, makes its determina­
tion of the facts, conditions, and circumstances, and 
the cause or probable cause of a major marine casual­
ty, using the record of the proceedings provided by 
the Commandant under the preceding paragraph and any 
additional evidence the Board may acquire under its 
own authority.
(5.6) The investigation by the Coast Guard is both 




The marine casualty investigation system in Canada is 
solely carried out by an independent safety board, the
Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and 
Safety Board (CTAISB).
1. General Overview. Inquiries on marine casualties 
were originally conducted on an ad hoc basis by officers 
of the Ship Safety Branch of the Canadian Coast Guard 
(CCG), Transport Canada, as part of their normal duties. 
That v/as until 1 April 1976 v;^hen the CCG Commissioner 
established for the purpose a Specialist Marine Casualty 
Investigations Division, CCGI/M which, although operated 
within the Coast Guard, was directly ansv;erable to the 
Commissioner. Following the study on Marine Casualty 
Investigations in Canada by Bernar d M. Deschenes, Q.C., 
the said Division left the Coast Guard, but remained in 
Transport Canada, and reported directly to the Marine 
Administrator. When the latter position was abolished in 
August 1975, the Division became directly ansv/erable to 
the Inspector General of Transport Safety. Recently, how­
ever, it was transformed into an independent transport 
safety board, the CTAISB, which received Royal Assent on 
29 June 1989 and came into effect on 29 March 1990, 
replacing and merging into one the Marine Division of 
Transport Canada, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, and 
the Rails and Pipeline Investigation Unit of the National
72
Transportation Agency.
The Board consists of a maximum of five members, one 
of whom is appointed Chairperson and Chief Executive 
Officer. To say the least, at the time of writing, it is 
still in the process of finalizing its organizational 
structure and amalgamation of its five regional offices.
The governing laws/rules are found in the Canadian 
Shipping Act and the Canadian Transportation Accident 
Investigation And Safety Board Act.
2. Authority and Jurisdiction. The CTAISB has ju­
risdiction over marine occurrences:
(2.1) in Canada, including the internal v/aters and
the territorial sea of Canada;
(2.2) in any other place, if
(2.2.1) Canada is requested to investigate the 
marine occurrence by an appropriate authority
(2.2.2) the marrine occurrence involves a ship 
registered or licensed in Canada, or
(2.2.3) a competent witness to, or person ha­
ving information concerning a matter that may 
have contributed to, the marine occurrence ar­
rives or is found at any place in Canada
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(2.3) related to an activity concerning the explo­
ration or exploitation of the continental shelf, 
where the marine occurrence takes place in waters 
above the continental shelf.
3. Purpose. The fundamental objective of the CTAISB 
investigation is to advance transportation safety by 
making known the cause(s) and contributing factors of an 
occurrence; by identifying safety deficiencies; by making 
recommendations designed to eliminate or reduce any such 
deficiencies; and by initiating/conducting special studies 
and special investigations on matters pertaining to safety 
in transportation. No findings of the Board are construed 
as assigning fault or determining civil or criminal liabi­
lity or are binding upon parties to any legal, disciplina­
ry or other proceedings.
4. Investigation Procedure. In minor accidents or 
occurrences, the field investigating officer merely veri­
fies for completeness the "WR Form" which is compulsorily 
required to be accomplished and submitted by the master or 
other persons responsible for the ship concerned in 
accordance with the Shipping Casualties Reporting Regu­
lations .
In more serious casualties, the field investigating 
officer who is armed with the aforecited "WR Form" pro­
ceeds to conduct a fact-finding investigation at the scene 
of the incident, inspects the ship, interviews v^itnesses 
privately (in camera) and compels the production of docu­
ments whenever necessary.
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The Minister of Transport Canada has the discretion 
to call for a formal investigation on a specific casualty 
which causes a considerable degree of concern, which 
results in loss of life or lives, or where causes cannot 
be determined by a preliminary inquiry, or where special 
safety lessons or practices are brought to his attention. 
He appoints a Commissioner (generally a judge) and two 
or more assessors to assist the latter.
Such investigation is held in pubic and in 
procedure, with a Commission Counsel presenting 
(in representation of the public interest) 




It must be noted, hov^ever, that the formal investiga­
tion procedure discussed above is undergoing revision 
along with the re-structuring of the Board itself v/hich is
about to enforce its autonomous authority. The most 
significant change in the procedure as proposed under the 
draft "Regulations Respecting the Canadian Transportation 
Accident Investigation and Safety Board" is that the v7hole 
activity shall be undertaken by the independent Board, in 
lieu of a Commissioner appointed by the Minister of Trans­
port Canada.
Conclusion
As already pointed out in Chapter II, the present 
marine casualty investigation system , in the Philippines 
has no particular agency of the government that really 
assumes the responsibility of investigation of marine 
cases for the primary purpose of improving water transport 
safety. MARINA and PCG investigations are not actually 
safety-related but are disciplinary or penal in nature. 
Because the said offices are regulatory and enforcement 
bodies, the possibility that their actions would entail 
many inconsistencies and insincerities is strong.
After analyzing the American and Canadian Systems 
discussed above, the author is confident to say that the 
idea of having an independent transport accident investi­
gation and safety board whose primary purpose in investi­
gation is purely for the enhancement of maritime safety, 
and not the imputation of fault, is the appropriate and 
proper solution to the issues so raised. The features of 
the neutral and independent board and its safety investi­
gation are: no regulatory, operational, and promotional 
responsibilities; non-adversarial nature; and complete 
separation from litigation and enforcement activities. 
Along with the creation of a new body, a new set of 
rules of procedure and techniques for investigation on 




MODEL RULES OF INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES AND PRACTICE
This Chapter shall provide model rules of investi­
gation procedures and practices which the author has 
built, selectively choosing and adapting parts taken from 
the different laws/rules/regulations prevailing in local 
and foreign jurisdictions and other sources. In addition, 
these investigation processes have been dravm upon as 
appropriate for possible application in the Philippine 
marine casualty investigation system.
1. Authority. The source of legal authority for in­
quiries/investigations, as well as an implementation basis 
for the relevant international obligations, has to be 
embodied in the national legislation. It is therefore 
necessary for the government to pass a lav? to (a) define 
what is a casualty, (b) provide for the circumstances in 
v/hich the administration may conduct inqui r i es / inves t iga- 
tions, and (c) prescribe the nature and extent of authori­
ty vested in ail those charged with responsibility in such 
matters.
2. Purpose. The primary objective of marine casual­
ty investigation should be the provision of better safety 
and protection of lives and property at sea. The investi­
gation must be a factfinding one and must not be aimed at 
determining or apportioning blame. However, the investi-
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gating authority should not be prohibited from making 
objective findings of fact from which it may be deduced or 
concluded that a person is at fault and should become sub­
ject to subsequent disciplinary or civil liability act­
ions.. The marine casualty investigation should be totally 
independent from any disciplinary or civil liability pro­
cesses. The evidence adduced in one must not be admissi­
ble in the other.
3. Jurisdiction. The Chairman of the Marine Trans­
port and Safety Board (MTSB) or his duly authorized 
investigating officer or Marine Tribunal shall have exclu­
sive jurisdiction to investigate all marine casualties/ 
accidents, involving Philippine registered or licensed 
ships V7herever they occur, or involving foreign ships when 
they occur within the navigable v/aters of the Philippines 
to the extent consistent v?ith international law.
4. Marine Casualty/Accident, Definition. The term 
"marine casualty/accident" shall mean any casualty or 
accident involving any vessel which occurs v;ithin the 
navigable waters of the Philippines, or any casualty or 
accident involving any Philippine vessel which occurs 
outside Philippine territorial waters. It shall include 
any occurrence involving a vessel which results in damage 
to a vessel, its apparel, gear, and/or passengers and 
crew, and inter alia includes sinking, collision, strand- 
ings, groundings, founderings, heavy weather damage, 
fires, explosions, failure of gear and equipment and any 
other damage which might affect and impair the seaworthi­
ness thereof.
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5. Reporting of Marine Casualties/ Accidents, Re­
quirements. The owner (or bareboat charterer) and master 
or person in charge of the vessel involved in a marine 
accident is required by law to report in detail the occur­
rence directly to the MTSB. A verbal report must be made 
within 24 hours from the time of accident, and a duly 
accomplished Written Casualty Report (WCR) form must be 
submitted as soon as possible.
Failure to comply with the herein provided require­
ment will subject the owner (or bareboat charterer) and 
the master or person in charge of the vessel involved to 
civil penalty.
6. Nature and Extent of Investigation. The investi­
gating authority should determine the causes of marine 
casualties and any contributing factors, identify safety 
deficiencies, and recommend corrective courses of action. 
All marine casualty rep^orts should be examined and causal 
determinations made. Where conclusions can easily be 
reached, no further investigations should be carried out 
and appropriate compilation of the data should be effected 
in order to help determine safety deficiencies or trends 
and to facilitate other analyses. When such reports are 
incomplete or not sufficiently informative to make causal 
determinations, further verification should informally and 
summarily be carried out. When causal determinations can­
not be reached through examination and verification of 
marine casualty reports, the investigating authority 
should carry out further investigations until such deter­
mination can be made, except where it is apparent that
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this determination cannot be achieved. When it appears 
that something unusual or something complex has occurred, 
or where it is apparent that important safety lessons can 
be learned, the investigating authority should investigate 
to the fullest extent possible until the facts are clearly 
established to its satisfaction. The investigating autho­
rity shall have full discretion as to the degree of any 
investigation to be carried out, provided that the exer­
cise of that discretion is supported by reason in all 
cases.
Preliminary Inquiries
7.1 Generally. Any duly appointed Investigating Of­
ficer of the MTSB may conduct a preliminary investigation 
as an initial step in determining the contributory factors 
and causes of marine casualties/ accidents, and whether a 
hearing should be held. Whenever the preliminary investi­
gating officer feels that there is reasonable doubt as 
to the facts and believes that the casualty/accident is of 
an unusual character, he shall recommend for a formal 
investigationy'
7.2 Powers and Duties of Preliminary Investigating 
Officers. The investigating officer in a preliminary 
investigation may examine any relevant papers, documents 
or records, interview witnesses, and go on board and 
examine vessels and equipment. He may obtain and collect 
evidence including but not limited to affidavits/ oral or 
written, signed or unsigned statements, books, papers, 
documents or records; and may make copies, take photo-
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graphs, and remove and mark any original documents or 
objects for future identification. It is the duty of 
every Preliminary Investigating Officer to ensure the 
complete development of all pertinent- facts, to establish 
to the best of his ability the cause of any casualty, and 
to make such recommendations in his report__aLS- will in his 
best judgement aid in preventing a recurr^e^^e __of_„the 
casualty, and in determining whether further action should 
be taken.
7.3 Conduct Of Preliminary Inquiry.
7.3.1 Venue. Whenever feasible, the proceedings 
under these rules should be conducted in the 
office of the MTSB; but these may be conducted 
elsewhere v;ith the consent of the Chairman.
At The Scene Of Casualty. On being directed to 
conduct a preliminary inquiry, the investigating 
officer should proceed to the scene as soon as 
possible, using whatever transportation is most 
readily available. In some cases, due to the 
urgency of the situation, the investigating offi­
cer may proceed to .the scene without waiting for 
orders, and arrange for the appointment to be sent 
to him in the area where the inquiry is to be 
conducted.
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Place Of Inquiry - Interviewing Witnesses. The 
venue must largely depend on the cirumstances, in 
eluding the availability of suitable facilities 
for conducting the proceedings. This may prove 
difficult where the inquiry takes place on board 
ship. Nevertheless privacy is an essential re­
quirement, and one which may well tax the investi­
gating officer's resourcefulness, tact and firm 
ness. Where a vessel is lost, witnesses should be 
interviewed in a suitable place close to where 
they were brought ashore. On such occasions, it 
may be necessary to enlist the assistance of local 
authorities. In other words, interviews must be 
carried out in a convenient place, one in which 
privacy is assured and where it is possible to 
segregate the waiting witnesses and interviev? them 
one at a time. Subpoenas to appear at the head­
quarters should also be served on any witnesses 
that appear reluctant or unwilling to attend the 
inquiry.
7.3.2 Who May Be Present At The Preliminary 
Inquiry. No person may attend an inquiry other 
than the follov/ing:
(a) the investigating officer;
<b) a person or persons requested by the 
investigating officer to advise or 
assist him;
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Cc) a person while giving evidence at the 
inquiry; and
(d) counsel for a person referred to in 
paragraph (c), while that person act­
ually gives evidence, but who shall 
not be allowed to actively participate 
in the proceedings.
7.3.3 Interview Of Witnesses. As a general rule, 
the interview of witnesses should be conducted 
informally; however, the right for investigating 
officers to require the oath at their discretion 
should be reserved.
Wherever possible, the philosophy of "in­
terview" should be employed rather than that of 
"interrogation". An interviev^ denotes a meeting 
in which the investigating officer approaches the 
witness on a co-operative but neutral basis.
The interview should not be restricted to 
the crews of the ships involved but should also 
include any other persons who may have pertinent 
inf ormation.
(a> Importance of early 
witnesses. The early 
witnesses, while the 




events are still 
is crucial. The 
must try to be
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the first to question the witnesses 
after the casualty, when their testi­
mony is likely to be given more freely 
and frankly. unaffected by considera­
tions of their testimony's implicat­
ions or its effects on themselves or 
others, and uninfluenced by the inte­
rested parties. If the preliminary 
inquiry is unduly delayed, the witnes­
ses might disperse and be unavailable 
such that the gathering of evidence 
may be much more difficult and costly.
(b) Assembling Of Witnesses. All availa­
ble vritnesses must be assembled before 
the start of the proceedings. They 
should be advised of the nature and 
purpose of the inquiry, the statutory 
authority under which it is held, and 
the manner by which it shall be con­
ducted .
<c) Types of witnesses. They are:
(c.l) Voluntary Witnesses - come 
forward to give evidence even though 
they have not been called to do so. 
While treating these persons in a 
friendly manner, the investigating 
officer should make every effort to 
determine their possible motives for
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coming forward. Such information 
should assist in the assessment and 
evaluation of their testimony.
<c.2) Willing Witnesses - include 
persons who have been called to be 
interviewed and who appear to be co­
operative and willing. Such witnes­
ses, if talkative, should first be 
permitted to complete what they have 
to say, provided it is relevant. 
Then, by specific questions, the in­
vestigating officer should seek ans­
wers to the essential facts.
<c.3) Unwilling Or Hostile Witness­
es - should be interviev?ed through a 
direct and authoritative 'interroga­
tion' (rather than ' interviev/') ap­
proach. They should be reminded that 
they must answer the questions asked 
of them and that failure to do so 
could hold them liable for contempt 
under the Administrative Code Of The 
Philippines-. If possible, these v/it- 
nesses should be served with a sub­
poena before the start of the inter­
view.
(d) Recording Of Witness Interviews. In­
vestigating Officers should prefera-
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faiy record the testimony of witnesses 
by mechanical means and they should 
also have the discretion to take writ­
ten statements or to rely on their own 
notes. Under normal circumstances tes­
timonies should be tape-recorded but 
not transcribed. However,when it seems 
probable from the outset that a formal 
investigation will be necessary, the 
investigating officer may avail him­
self of the services of a court repor­
ter or other stenographic services, 
to transcribe the proceedings. The 
transcribers should be instructed not 
to make copies, and to give the origi­
nal transcripts duly signed by them to 
the investigating officer. Except for 
official court reporters (v/ho by the 
nature of their duties have already 
been sworn), all transcribers should 
be sworn before the start of the 
inquiry.
7.3.4 Production of Documents. The investigating 
officers are empowered to require and enforce the 
production of all books, papers or documents that 
are considered important for the purpose of the 
preliminary inquiry. However, they cannot retain 
them indefinitely. Thus they should make contin­
gency arrangements to have photocopies made of the 
items they intend to include in their report.
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Care should be taken to check for forged or 
altered documents. Sometimes, investigating offi~
cers will know in advance f rom the nature of the
casualty what books or documents should be pro-
duced at the inquiry. They should ensure the
production of these items by serving a Subpoena
Duces Tecum on the appropriate witnesses and list 
ing the items that should be produced.
7.3.5 Use of Charts, Sketches and Photographs.
In casualties such as groundings and strandings, 
or collisions in narrov/ channels, witnesses able 
to do so should be asked to mark the approximate 
positions on a chart supplied by the investigat­
ing officer. Witnesses doing so should use a 
separate chart, and should be required to place 
their initials next to the marked position.
In collision cases, some vT’itnesses may find 
it easier to sketch rather than describe the re­
lative angles of approach from that moment until 
the collision. Such sketches should also pro­
vide a better description of both angle and 
point of collision. Sketches should also be 
initialled by the witnesses concerned.
Photographs taken either by the investigating 
officer or others, and properly marked for identi­
fication, should provide excellent evidence of the 
angle and point of impact and also a fair estimate 
of the speed of the striking vessel.
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8. Formal Investigation.
8.1 General. It is advisable to hold a formal in­
vestigation in all cases of serious marine casualties 
resulting in loss of life, substantial pollution or subs­
tantial property damage. The formal investigation shall 
consist of a hearing that is open to the public (save to 
the extent that, when national security is endangered, any 
part of the evidence or any argument relating thereto 
should be heard in private) and, during which, witnesses 
are examined for purposes of complementing the preliminary 
inquiry and airing publicly the facts and the safety 
issues involved. It shall be purely a factfinding pro­
ceeding that does not involve pleadings or an adversarial 
process.
8.2 Hearing Officers; Marine Tribunal. Formal In­
vestigations may be carried out by:
(a) a single hearing officer, preferably the 
Chief or Senior Investigating Officer of 
the MTSB; or
(b) a Marine (administrative) Tribunal of at 
least three members, including a de­
signated Chairperson, v/hich the Chairman 
of the MTSB may form in very serious 
marine cases.
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8.3 Powers and Duties of Hearing Officers/Marine 
Tribunal. The Hearing Officer/Marine Tribunal shall have 
the power to set hearings; administer oaths; identify and 
compel the attendance of persons having knowledge of the 
subject matter under investigation to testify at the sche­
duled hearings; require the production of relevant evi­
dence including but not limited to books, papers, docu­
ments and records; rule upon the nature and admissibility 
of evidence; board and inspect the vessels and their 
appurtenances, and visit the scene of the casualty. This 
implies the exercise by the Hearing Officer/Marine Tribu­
nal of all control necessary or appropriate to ensure the 
orderly -and procedural conduct of the hearing and the 
development of relevant and material facts.
8.4 Venue. The formal investigation may be held at 
the hearing room in the building where the MTSB is 
located or elsewhere at the sound discretion of the 
Hearing Officer/Marine Tribunal.
8.5 General Admission to Hearings. The" Hearing 
Officer/Marine Tribunal may admit interested parties and/ 
or states with their counsels or official representatives, 
and observers to attend the hearings; provided, the 
Hearing Officer/Marine Tribunal may exclude the general 
public and/or the media whenmatters of confidentiality or 
questions of national security arise.
8.6 Recorder, Notices/Subpoenas. There should be 
appointed an official Recorder who shall give written 
notice in advance of any hearing to all known interested
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parties or states, specifying the date, time, place and 
subject matter of the hearing. Alternatively or addition­
ally, a notice of hearing may be given by public announce­
ment. The recorder shall prepare for' the Hearing Officer/ 
Officer/Marine Tribunal's signature subpoenas to witnesses 
for them to appear at the place and date of hearing and 
testify. Notices/subpoenas must be sent personally or, if 
impractical, by registered mail to the parties and witnes­
ses at their last knovm addresses at least five days prior 
to the date set for hearing.
The recorder shall take charge of the recording and 
transcription of the proceedings and, where practicable, 
of the exhibits in evidence, and also of the keeping of 
the whole records of the case..
8.7 Hearing Proper. The hearing shall proceed on 
the date, time and place, as pre-scheduled, in the follow­
ing order:
(a) The Hearing Officer or Chairperson of 
the Marine Tribunal calls the session 
into order;
(b) The Recorder will publicly make known 
the preliminary inquiry report toge­
ther with all the supporting evidence, 
and it shall then be open to comments/ 
arguments of the interested parties;
<c) The proceedings shall continue with
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the production and examination of wit­
nesses of facts, including the preli­
minary investigating officer, and ex­
pert witnesses, who may be cross- 
examined by the interested parties;
<d) The interested parties may be allowed 
to adduce documentary evidence, call 
witnesses, and cross-examine witnes­
ses called by any other party. Every 
formal investigationv shall be con­
ducted in such a manner that if subs­
tantial criticism is made against any 
person that person shall be given the 
opportunity of making his defense ei­
ther in person or otherv;^ise;
(e> The Hearing Officer or Marine Tribu­
nal may adjourn the proceedings from 
from time to time, and where the ad­
journment IS asked for by any party, 
the hearing officer or tribunal may 
impose such terms as payments of costs 
or otherwise as he thinks just as a 
condition of granting the adjournment; 
and
Cf> At the end of the proceedings, any 
interested party may be allowed to 
make a final statement or to sub­
mit a written memorandum within five
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days, as to assist the hearing officer 
or tribunal in resolving the case.
9. Reports of Marine Casualty Investigations. Upon 
completion of the preliminary inquiry or the formal inves­
tigation, as the case may be, the Investigation Officer/ 
Hearing Officer/Marine Tribunal should submit to the 
Chairman of the MTSB, an investigation report which 
should include a factual narrative of the events, an 
objective analysis of the evidence and findings as to the 
contributing factors and causes of the marine occurrences, 
as well as other safety-related findings, and his recom­
mendations based thereon. It is necessary that the iden­
tity of the ship and shipowner be stated in the report 
except when such identification v/ill result in the deter­
mination of blame or liability.
10. Final Action.
10.1 Board's Decision. Upon receipt of the report 
and file or record of the case, the Board shall proceed 
to make and render its Decision in the form of "Report 
and Safety Recommendations".
10.1 Copies of Decision - Service; Response. Copies 
of the Board's Decision shall be sent to all concerned 
parties, offices, and states. In the case of government 
offices, they must respond to each recommendation formally 
and in writing within ninety days from receipt of the 
Board's Decision. The response shall indicate the inten­
tion of the office concerned to-
<a> initiate and conduct procedures for adopting such 
a recommendation in full, pursuant to a proposed 
timetable, a copy of which shall be included;
<b) initiate and conduct procedures for adopting such 
recommendation in part, pursuant to a proposed 
timetable, a copy of which shall be included. 
Such response shall set forth in detail the 
reasons for the refusal to proceed to the remain 
der of such a recommendation; or
(c) refuse to initiate or conduct procedures for 
adopting such a recommendation. Such response 
shall set forth in detail the reasons for such 
refusal.





This Chapter shall outline a new administrative 
structure and the procedural rules envisioned to be 
necessary for the improvement of the marine casualty 
investigation system in the Philippines. Both will be 
framed on the basis of the analytical study that the 
author has undertaken herein and exhaustively discussed in 
the earlier chapters. By v/ay of recommendations which are 
believed to be essential for the achievement of the 
previously discussed goals and objectives for improving 
maritime safety, the following is offered as an improved 
marine casualty investigation system for the Philippines.
The basic recommendations are made, knowing that 
effective implementation can only be achieved v^ith the 
cooperation of the legislative body of the government, 
since amendments of the existing laws will be required. 
It is to be emphasized that the budgetary issues related 
to these proposals have been consciously considered, 
striving to maximize the benefits of improved maritime 
safety for the people of the Philippines, the most modest 
economic cost. The government of the Philippines must 
seriously take into account that so many lives are lost 
from sea disasters due to lack of sufficient administra­
tive and technical knowledge on how to prevent such
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occurrences. The government must begin to recognize that 
simple geography makes the Philippines a maritime nation. 
The stimulation of economic growth in ail sectors in which 
the government has programs will be tied to the efficient 
and proper use of the nation's maritime resources and 
infrastructure. These programs must work hand-in-hand 
with maritime sector programs. Otherwise, development in 
other sectors will overstress already fragile maritime 
capabilities and this in turn will stifle the desired 
economic growth v/hile costing more and more in terms of 
life and property lost at sea. It is hightime that the 
Philippine government, v;hose priorities have long been 
directed at the many problems confronting it in other 
areas Ce.g. education, health, labour, and insurgency) 
must turn its focus to the cooperative role that must be 
played by maritime affairs. Otherv/ise, economic growth 
v?ill come very slov/ly and only at the expense of needless 
loss of lives in increasing numbers of sea tragedies. To 
fuel a nation's economic engine at the expense of the 
needless loss of life of its citizens is simply not 
acceptable.
1. New Structure.
The difficulties have previously been explained con­
cerning the adverse implications created by the dual 
jurisdiction given to MARINA and PCG. Both of these 
organizations are regulatory bodies and have potential 
for "conflict of interest" in carrying out their respect­
ive responsibilities. Thus, there is a need for a new 
structure to serve as investigative arm of the government
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in marine cases, providing recommendations for the evolu­
tion of rules and regulations that will lead to the 
advancement of maritime transport safety.
1.1 Legislative Requirements
Recommendation ONE: A law should be passed creating an
independent marine accident investigation and safety 
board, to be called the Marine Transport Safety Board 
(MTSB) which shall be directly under the Office of the 
President and shall report annually to Congress.
A government body in the Philippines is created only 
by law. Hence, legislation is required to establish the 
proposed board.
The main point in giving autonomous authority to the 
board is the "impartiality of marine accident investiga­
tions". This can be attained only v/hen that body is 
devoid of the perception of 'conflict of interest' and can 
be 'unbiased or unprejudiced'. By playing a role solely 
as investigating authority and not involving itself in 
other areas of maritime activities like the issuance of 
clearances to sail, enforcement of maritime laws and 
rules, this can be achieved. There is actually a need 
to separate casualty investigation from regulatory and 
enforcement activities.
The 'independence' of the board is contemplated to 
mean the absence of subordinance to any office lower than 
the major branches of the government, i.e. the Office of
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the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court. That the 
board has to report annually to Congress, oust like any 
other independent agency of the government does for 
practical reasons such as budgetary considerations, would 
not diminish its independence.
The board which v/ould have full freedom of action can 
criticize the deficiences of other government offices and 
exercise a sort of 'watchdog function', thereby elimina­
ting or substantially reducing the existing risks of 
'conflict of interest' also inherent in the present 
arrangements in the Philippines.
1.2 Jurisdictional Competence
Recommendation TWO: The Board ' should have exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate all marine casualties/ 
accidents, involving Philippine registered or licensed 
ships wherever the'y occur, or involving foreign ships 
when they occur within the navigable waters of the 
-Iippinss to the extent consistent with international 
law.
The jurisdictional requirement must be clearly de­
fined in national legislation to provide for the limits 
within which the competence of the investigating authority 
could be exercised. Not only Philippine flag ships can be 
the subject of jurisdiction but also foreign ships in­
volved in occurences that, one way or the other, disturb 
the tranquility and security of the country. This is 
fundamental under the principle of a state's sovereignty.
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1.3 Administrative Composition
Recommendation THREE: The Board should consist of at
least three members, including a Chairman, who shall 
all be appointed by the President and confirmed by 
Congress on the basis of technical qualification, 
professional standing, and demonstrated knowledge in 
the fields of accident reconstruction, safety engineer­
ing, human factors, transportation safety, or transpor­
tation regulations.
Recommendation FOUR: The term of office of members of the
Board shall be five years. Any individual appoint­
ed to fill a vacancy occurring in the Board prior to 
the expiration of the term of office for which his 
predecessor was appointed shall serve for the remain 
der of the term. Upon expiration of his term of 
office, a member shall continue to hold over until his 
successor is appointed and shall have qualified. Any 
member of the Board may be removed by the President 
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
office.
Recommendation FIVE: Directly under the members of the
Board should be a regular staff of a small, limited 
number of qualified assisting personnel. The assist­
ing Marine Casualty Investigators must be chosen from 
among suitably qualified applicants, having expertise 
in either naval architecture, nautical engineering, 
marine engineering and/or law. They shall be designated 
as The Chief or Senior Investigating Officers and
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Investigating Officers.
Recommendation SIX: Provisions should be made for Inves
tigating Officers to undergo continuing educational/ 
training courses to remain abreast with the changes in 
their technical fields and other areas, such as: 
interview and interrogation techniques; photography; 
safety standards, classification societies, IMO, and 
national standards.
Recommendation SEVEN: Whenever necessary, the Board may
hire the services of technical consultants/advisers.
Marine casualty investigation is a specialized task 
that requires from those selected for such duties high 
integrity and full public trust and also the ncessary 
qualifications .and skills.
In particular, the investigating officers to v/hom 
people would give testimonies must be fully qualified to 
carry out their authority. They should have qualifica­
tions comparative or superior to those witnesses they 
shall possibly interview. It follows, therefore, that 
investigating officers who are seafarers should possess 
certificates of competency as master mariner or chief 
engineer, or equivalent experience; non-seafaring investi­
gators should possess a degree or diploma in naval archi­
tecture, nautical engieering, marine engineering or lav/.
For investigations to be carried out effectively, 










must also possess certain quali- 
natures, aptitude for investiga- 
objectivity, diligence, patience
When investigating casualties which involve areas 
outside their own discipline, investigating officers 
should request the assistance of technical advisers who 
have the appropriate expertise.
2. Investigation Procedures and Processes
Along vrith the administrative re-structuring of the 
marine casualty investigation system in the Philippines, 
the need for a new set of rules of investigation processes 
has been discussed in the previous chapters. Chapter IV 
of this paper gives a model of such rules. On that basis, 
the following recommendations are considered to be proper 
and appropriate.
2.1 Authority.
Recommendation EIGHT: A law should be
fine what is a casualty/accident, 
circumstances in which the administ 
inquiries/investigations, and <c) p 
and extent of authority vested in 
with responsibility in such matters
It is a common rule and practice 
dictions that sources of legal author!
passed to P Q. (D 1




in almost all juris-
ties and responsibi-
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lities must be specifically provided for in a national law 
which should also consider international obligations,
2.2 Purpose.
Recommendation NINK: The primary obd©ctive of marine cas
ualty investigations should be the improvement of safe~ 
ty of life and property at sea. The safety-related 
investigation must be a factfinding one and must not 
determine or apportion blame. However, the investiga­
ting authority should not be prohibited from making 
objective findings of fact from which it may be deduced 
or concluded that a person is at fault so as to be 
subject to disciplinary or civil liability action. The 
marine casualty investigation should be totally inde­
pendent and separate from any disciplinary or civil 
liability processes.
The marine casualty investigation is hereby contem­
plated to be simply a mode of identifying safety deficien­
cies, finding out the causes of the occurrrences, acquir- 
ring knowledge therefrom, and recommending measures to 
prevent recurrences. The aspects of investigation on 
discipline and civil penalty, v/herein the validity of 
licenses and other pertinent navigation documents is in 
question, should be discarded in this instance and must be 
left to the sound disposition of the issuing authorities 
which have the corresponding right to revoke or suspend 
v?hat they had previously issued. Hence, a totally inde­
pendent marine casualty investigation separate from the 
disciplinary and civil liability actions is recommended.
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The rationale behind this recommendation is that 
primary safety aims ought not to be impeded by other con­
siderations. Disciplinary and civil liability considerat­
ions could result in such impediments because the threat 
of future penalties inhibits witnesses and therefore 
prevents all the facts from being brought out. Likewise, 
the issues to be considered become more complicated so 
that the investigation itself may become more prolonged 
and more costly.
2.3 Jurisdiction.
Recommendation TEN: The investigating authority should
have exclusive jurisdiction to investigate all marine 
casualties/accidents, involving Philippine registered 
or licensed ships wherever they occur, or involving 
foreign ships when they occur within the navigable 
waters of the Philippines to the extent consistent with 
international law.
Just like the source of legal authority, the juris­
diction of those in charge of investigations must clearly 
be defined by law, also taking into account the state's 
international obligations.
2.4 Marine Casualty/Accident, Definition
Recommendation ELEIVEN: The term "marine casualty/accident" 
shall mean any casualty or accident involving any 
vessel when it occurs within the navigable waters of 
the Philippines, or any casualty or accident involving
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a Philippine documented or licensed ship wherever 
occurring. It shall include any occurrence involving a 
vessel which results in damage to a vessel, its appa- 
apparel, gear, and/or passengers and crew, and inter 
alia includes sinking, collision, strandings, ground­
ings, founderings, heavy weather damage, fires, explo­
sions, failure of gear and equipment and any other 
damage which might affect and impair the seaworthiness 
thereof.
The above recommended definition has been developed 
by the author out of other sources giving similar or 
standardized definition which are deemed acceptable and 
applicable to the Philippine marine casualty investigation 
system.
It must be noted that "casualty", and "accident" 
are treated interchangeably as to refer to one and the 
same thing.
2.5 Reporting of Marine Casualties/Accidents.
Recommendation TWELVE: The owner <or bareboat charterer)
and master or person in charge of the vessel involved 
in a marine accident is required by law to report in 
detail the occurrence directly to the Board. A verbal 
report must be made within 24 hours from the time of 
accident, and a duly accomplished written casualty 
report (WCR) form must be submitted as soon as possi­
ble. Failure to comply with the reporting requirement 
should subject the owner (or bareboat charterer) and
the master or person in charge of the vessel involved 
to civil penalty.
The mandatory requirement of reporting shipping cas­
ualties or accidents especially those resulting in loss of 
life or serious injury or damage to property, and the 
corresponding penalty for non-compliance thereof should be 
provided for by law. The investigating authority should 
define through regulations those casualties and accidents 
which must be reported.
2.6 Nature and Extent of Investigation.
Recommendation THIRTEEN: To improve further safety of
lives and property in the marine mode of transport, 
the investigating authority should determine the con­
tributing factors and causes of marine casualties, 
identify safety deficiencies, and recommend corrective 
courses of action. All marine casualty reports should 
be examined and causal determinations made; where con­
clusions can easily be reached, no further investigat­
ions should be carried out and appropriate recordings 
should be effected in order to help determine safety 
deficiencies trends or other analyses. When such 
reports are incomplete or not sufficiently informative 
to make causal determinations, further verification 
should informally and summarily be carried out. When 
causal determinations cannot be reached through exami­
nation and verification of marine casualty reports, the 
investigating authority should carry out further inves­
tigations until such determination can be made except
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where it is apparent that this determination cannot be 
achieved. When it appears that something unusual or 
something complex has occurred or where it is apparent 
that important safety lessons can be learned, the 
investigating authority should investigate to the full­
est extent possible until the facts are clearly estab­
lished to its satisfaction. The investigating authori­
ty shall have full discretion as to the degree of any 
investigation to be carried out, provided that the 
exercise of that discretion is supported by reason in 
all cases.
On account of the recommended compulsory legal re­
quirement for the reporting of marine occurrences to the 
proper authorities, there is a strong possibility of 
congestion of the reports of cases, the investigation of a 
great madority of which would not accord any benefit 
v/hatsoever and, if all were investigated fully, would be 
extremely costly for the government.
It is therefore advisable that the decision to 
investigate as well as determine the nature and extent of 
investigation (either by V7ay of an informal or preliminary 
inquiry or formal investigation) be left to the sound 
discretion of the investigation authority, v;hich discret­
ion must be acceptable.
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2.7 Preliminary Inquiries.
Recommendation FOURTEEN: Any duly appointed investiga­
ting officer of the Board may conduct a preliminary 
investigation as an initial step in determining the 
contributory factors and causes of marine casualties/ 
accidents, and whether a hearing should be held. When­
ever the preliminary investigating officer feels that 
there is reasonable doubt as to the facts and believes 
that the casualty/accident is of an unusual character, 
he shall recommend a formal investigation.
Recommendation FIFTEEN: The preliminary investigating
officer may examine any relevant papers, documents or 
records, interview witnesses, and go on board and 
examine vessels and equipment. He may obtain and 
collect evidence including but not limited to affida­
vits, oral or written, signed or unsigned statements, 
books, papers, documents or records and may make 
copies, take photographs, and remove and mark any 
original documents or objects for future identificat­
ion. The preliminary investigating officer must ensure 
the complete development of all pertinent facts, to 
establish to the best of his ability the cause of any 
casualty and to make such recommendations in his report 
as will in his best -judgment aid in preventing a 
recurrence of the casualty and in determining whether 
further action should be taken.
Recommendation SIXTEEN: Whenever feasible, the proceed­
ings should be conducted in the office of the Board;
but these may be conducted elsewhere with the consent 
of the Chairman of the Board. On being directed to 
conduct a preliminary inquiry, the investigating offi­
cer should proceed to the scene as soon as possible, 
using whatever transportation is most readily availa­
ble. In some cases, due to the urgency of the situa­
tion, the investigating officer may proceed to the 
scene without waiting for orders, and arrange for the 
appointment to be sent to him in the area where the 
inquiry is to be conducted.
Recommendation SEVENTEEN: No person may attend the inqui­
ry other than the investigating officer, persons 
requested by the investigating officer to advise him, 
and a person giving evidence by himself or by counsel. 
However, counsels shall not be allowed to actively 
participate in the inquiry.
Recommendation EIGHTEEIN: All available witnesses must be
assembled before the start of the proceedings. They 
should be advised of the nature and purpose of the 
inquiry, the statutory authority under which it is 
held, and the manner by which it shall be conducted.
Recommendation NINETEEN: The interview of witnesses
should be conducted informally; however, the right for 
the investigating officer to require the oath shall be 
reserved. In short, whenever possible, witnesses 
should be interviewed and not interrogated. The inter­
view must be carried out in a convenient place, one in 
which privacy is assured and where it is possible
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to segregate the waiting witnesses and interview them 
one at a time.
Pecommendation TWENTY: The investigating officer must try
to be the first to question the witnesses after the 
casualty, when their testimony is likely to be given 
more freely and frankly, unaffected by considerations 
of their testimony's implications or its effects on 
themselves or others, and uninfluenced by the interest­
ed parties. The investigating officer should make 
every effort to determine the possible motives of 
voluntary witnesses and such information should assist 
him in the assessment and evaluation of their testimo­
nies. Willing witnesses, if talkative, should first be 
permitted to complete what they have to say, provided 
it is relevant; after which, the investigating officer 
should ask specific questions as to the essential 
facts. If possible, unwilling or hostile witnesses
should be served with a subpoena before the start of 
the interrogation. They should be advised that they 
must answer the questions and that their failure could 
subject them to the penalty of law.
Recommendation TWENTY-ONE: Investigating officers should
preferably record the testimony of witnesses by mecha­
nical means and they should also have the discretion to 
take written statements or to rely on their own notes. 
Under normal circumstances, testimonies should be tape- 
recorded but not transcribed. When it seems probable 
from the outset that a formal investigation will be 
necessary, the investigating officer may obtain the
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s@rvicss of s. court rsportsr or oth©r st©nogra.phic
s©rvic©s to transcrib© th© proc©©dings. Th© trariscri- 
b©rs should b© instruct©d not to mak© copies and to
give th© original transcripts duly signed by them to 
the investigating officer. Except for official court 
reporters (who by the nature of their duties have
already been sworn), all transcribers should be sworn 
before the start of the inquiry.
Recommendation TWENTY-TWO: The investigating officer
should be empowered to require and enforce the product­
ion of all books, papers or documents that they
consider important for the purpose of the preliminary 
inquiry; however, they cannot retain them. They should 
rather make contingency arrangements to have photo­
copies of the items they opt to include in their 
report. Care should be taken to check for forged or 
altered documents. The investigating officer should 
ensure the production of books, papers or documents by 
serving a subpoena duces tecum on the appropriate 
witnesses and listing the items that should be pro­
duced .
Recommendation TWENTY-THREE:. In casualties such as 
groundings and strandings, or collisions in narrow 
channels, witnesses able to do so should be asked to 
mark the approximate positions on a chart supplied by 
the investigating officer. They should also be asked 
to use a separate chart and be required to place their 
initials next to the marked position. In collision 
sketches made by witnesses to show the relative
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cases,
angles of approach to the time of collision should 
^provide a better description of the angles and the 
point of collision. The sketches should also be ini­
tialled by the witnesses concerned. Photographs taken 
by the investigating officer or others should properly 
be marked for identification purposes and should pro­
vide excellent evidence of the angles and point of 
impact and a fair estimate of the speed of the striking 
vessel.
Obviously, a preliminary inquiry is conducted for a 
dual purpose, i.e. to determine the probable cause(s) of a 
casualty and the safety measures, and whether there is a 
need to proceed to a formal investigation of the case.
The idea of holding the proceedings in a preliminary 
inquiry v/ith some sorts of privacy and informality is 
aimed at maintaining the confidentiality and sacredness of 
the vital and first-hand information gathered thereat. 
This is the main distinction betv^een a preliminary inquiry 
and a formal investigation which is rather open and 
public.
In conducting preliminary inquiries, the time element 
is of the essence. The investigating officer must proceed 
to the scene of the casualty and collect relevant and 
material evidence the soones t . poss ib 1 e and v/ithout much 
unnecessary delay; otherwise, he might lose the chance of 
gaining fresh and genuine information. Witnesses may be 
influenced by the interested parties or go into hiding so 
that the investigating officer may find it difficult to
110
locate them and obtain their accounts about the occur 
rence. To deal v/ith the witnesses, the investigating 
officer must assess and evaluate their credibility and 
motive in testifying.
The investigating officer upon whom a large scale of 
discretion is lodged must exercise this with objectivity, 
tact, and fairness. He has full control over the conduct 
of the proceedings to see to it that there will be order 
and continuity in the process.
2.8 Formal Investigation
Recommendation TWENTY-FOUR: A formal investigation should
be held in all cases of very serious marine casualties 
resulting in loss of life or substantial property 
damage. The formal investigation should consist of a 
hearing that is open to the public (save to the extent 
that, in the interest of justice or other good and 
sufficient reason in the public interest, any part of 
the evidence or any argument relating thereto should be 
heard in private) and during which witnesses are 
examined for purposes of complementing the preliminary 
inquiry and airing publicly the facts and the safety 
issues involved. Formal investigations should be pure 
ly a factfinding proceeding that does not involve 
pleadings or adversarial processes.
Recommendation TWENTY-FIVE: There should be a Hearing
Officer, preferably the Chief or Senior Investigating 
Officer, or a Marine Tribunal of at least three
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members, including the Chairperson, to be appointed 
by the Chairman of the Board, to conduct the formal 
investigation in very serious marine cases.
Recommendation TWENTY-SIX: The Hearing Officer/Marine
Tribunal should have the power to set hearings; 
administer oaths; identify and compel the attendance 
of persons having knowledge of the subject matter under 
investigation to testify at the scheduled hearings, 
require the production of relevant evidence including 
but not limited to books, papers, documents and 
records; rule upon the nature and admissibility of 
evidence; board and inspect the vessels and their 
appurtenances; and visit the scene of the casualty. 
The Hearing Officer/Marine Tribunal should have all the 
control necessary or appropriate to ensure the orderly 
and procedural conduct of the hearing and the develop­
ment of■relevant and material facts.
Recommendation TWENTY-SEVEN: The formal investigation
must be held in the hearing room within the same 
building where the MTSB is located or elsewhere at 
the sound discretion of the Hearing Officer/Marine 
Tribunal.
Recommendation TWENTY-EIGHT: The formal investigation
should be open to the general public, regardless of 
whether they are real-parties-in-interest or mere ob­
servers. A proviso is that the Hearing Officer/Marine 
Tribunal may exclude the general public and/or the 
media when matters of confidentiality or questions
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of national security arise.
Recommendation TWENTY-NINE: There should be appointed an
official Recorder who shall take charge of the record­
ing and transcription of the proceedings and of the 
exhibits in evidence, and of the keeping of the whole 
records of the case. The Recorder should give written 
notices to all known interested parties or states and 
subpoenas to witnesses in advance of any hearing, 
specifying therein the date, time, place and subject 
matter of the hearing.
Recommendation THIRTY: Notices/subpoenas must be sent
personally or, if impractical, by registered mail to 
the parties and witnesses at their last known addresses 
at least five days before the hearing.
Recommendation THIRTY-ONE: The hearing should proceed on
the time, date, and place, as pre-scheduled, with the 
Hearing Officer or Chairperson of the Marine Tribunal 
formally opening the session. The recorder should 
present to the public the preliminary inquiry report 
and its supporting evidence which shall be subject to 
comments/ arguments of the interested parties. The 
interested parties should be allowed to adduce their 
own evidence and cross-examine the witnesses for the 
other parties. At the end of the proceedings, real- 
par ties—in—interest should be allowed to make a final 
statement or to submit a written memorandum within five 
days; which statement/memorandum must be considered 
by the investigating officer in his assessment of the
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case and preparation of his report.
In major marine casualties, a formal investigation 
which is open to the public should be conducted. Here, 
real-parties-in-interest are entitled to participate in 
the proceedings, to adduce evidence, and to examine and 
cross-examine witnesses whose testimonies are placed under 
oath; the owners or charterers and the master of the ship 
concerned are always made parties thereto.
The formal investigation shall be based on, but not 
limited to, the contents of the preliminary inquiry 
report.
It shall be in the form of a hearing which is 
conducted with orderliness and proper solemnities.
2.9 Reports of Marine Casualty Investigation
Recommendation THIRTY-TWO: Upon completion of the pre­
liminary inquiry or formal investigation, as the case 
may be, the Investigating Officer/Hearing Officer/ 
Marine Tribunal should submit to the Chairman of the 
MTSB, an investigation report which should include a 
factual narrative of the events, an objective analysis 
of the evidence and findings as to the contributory 
factors and causes of the marine occurrences, as well 
as other safety-related findings, and the recommenda­
tions based thereon.
An after-investigation-report, of course, is very
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essential as it will be the basis for the administrative 
action or disposition of the case by the Board Itself 
which has the task of making objective analysis of the 
facts and then making the final report and recommendations 
towards the advancement of safety protection at sea.
2.10 Final Action
Recommendation THIRTY-THREE: Upon receipt of the report
mentioned in paragraph 2.9 and the file or record of 
the case, the Board shall render its Decision in the 
form of^'Report and SafVtjf'RecommenH'a^TohsCopies of 
the Board Decision shall be furnished to all concerned
parties, offices, and states. Any addressee govern-
\
ment office must be required by law to respond to 
every safety recommendation formally and in writing 
within ninety (90) days from receipt of the Decision. 
Such responses must be made available to the public's 
perusal.
The law creating the Board should include provisions 
defining the authority of the Members of the Board to 
render the final report and recommendations in accordance 
with its goals and objectives. Two members may be made to 
constitute a quorum in furtherance of such authority.
Every party concerned must be furnished with a copy 
of the Board Report. Whenever the safety recommendation 
is addressed to any government agency for appropriate 
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